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State-initiated Food Sovereignty: The Case of Cuba’s Special Period 
By Negar Sakhai 
 
Abstract 
The persistence of the global recession and rising food costs have strengthened the 
argument that food sovereignty is the solution to global hunger.  But is food sovereignty 
even possible in the context of a globalized free-market world? Has food sovereignty, as 
it is defined by the Food Sovereignty paradigm, ever been achieved? These are important 
questions to answer if food sovereignty is to be approached as the solution to the rising 
social, ecological, and economic issues that have become global concerns. This thesis 
aims to answer these questions by assessing the degree to which Cuba achieved food 
sovereignty during its special period of 1990 – 1996, in accordance with the Six Pillars of 
Food Sovereignty. Additionally, this study operationalizes the criteria for food 
sovereignty into an analytical framework through Karl Polanyi’s concepts of fictitious 
commodities.  This study finds that Cuba achieved a high level of food sovereignty 
during the special period.  
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We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom 
cannot exist without economic security and independence. “Necessitous men are 
not free men.” People who are hungry and out of a job are the stuff of which 
dictatorships are made. 
In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-evident. We have 
accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security 
and prosperity can be established for all regardless of station, race, or creed 
(Franklin Roosevelt, as quoted by Ziegler 2013, p. 95)  
 
Franklin Roosevelt made this speech in 1945, months before he passed away (Ziegler, 
2013) and although his second Bill of Rights never came into being, his speech 
acknowledged the need to end hunger and to prioritize human wellbeing above all things. 
This perspective grew out of the experience of vast human suffering that accompanied the 
global Great Depression; it led to the societal consensus that industrialized societies 
require stronger regulations to protect society from the volatility of the market (Polanyi, 
2001; Saul, 2005; Davidson, 2009; Ziegler, 2013). Consequently, as John Saul (2005) 
explains, “The unprecedented post-war expansion of public services, egalitarian 
intentions and economic growth had confirmed that need. Progress and regulations went 
hand in hand, as they had in every successful long-term civilization in history” (Saul, 
2005, p. 72). 
Accordingly, many researchers argue that in order to address the current and 






insecurity and market-led development is essential (Bello, 2009; Holt-Giménez, 2009a; 
McMichael & Schneider, 2011). In development studies it is well documented in that 
societal shifts occur when one development model is replaced by another. For example 
the shift from the state-led development model of the late 1940s to the market-led 
development model of the 1970s saw the re-conceptualization of food and food security, 
which many researchers argue has helped to fuel global food insecurity (Roberts, 2008).   
As a consequence of the global recession of 2007-2008, by 2010 almost one 
billion of the world’s population of 7 billion people had fallen into a state of “permanent 
hunger” (Ziegler, 2013, p.4). The gravity of this situation has not yet been addressed by 
international organizations, partially due to the common misconception that present-day 
food crises are the outcomes of global food scarcity and/ or due to growing global 
populations (Poole-Kavana, 2006; Patel, 2012; Ziegler, 2013). However, researchers have 
found the opposite to be true on both accounts.  Former United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Jean Ziegler (2013) explains that, 
“In its current state, the global agricultural system would in fact, without any 
difficulty, be capable of feeding 12 billion people, or twice the world’s current 
population. Hunger is thus in no way inevitable” (Ziegler, 2013, p. xiii). 
Moreover, studies suggest that the roots of food insecurity in the neoliberal era are 
connected to the market-led development agenda’s conceptualization of food as a 
commodity rather than as a basic human right (Murphy, 2008; Roberts, 2008; McMichael 






was designed as an alternative to the free market-based framework of food security, 
maintains that there is a direct tie between the rise in global poverty and development 
agendas. For example, food sovereignty researcher Eric Holt-Giménez (2009a) explains 
that, “[t]he current global food crisis [was] decades in the making” (2009a, p. 142). He 
contends that the advancement of the neoliberal development agenda and the 
amalgamation of  the private sector with  industrial agriculture, mostly “through the 
monopolization of input industries, industrial farming, processing, and retailing ...” (Holt-
Giménez, 2009a, p.142)  have led to the current global food uncertainties. Consequently, 
the framing of food as a commodity has allowed it to be a subject to market rules as well 
as its volatilities (Ziegler, 2013) whereas if it were framed as an essential human right, 
then nations would be obliged to protect their national food sovereignty in order to protect 
the interest of their populations (Murphy, 2008; Roberts, 2008), as was the case with 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Keynesian recovery programs during the Great Depression and the 
state-led development project that was initiated to rebuild post-World War II Europe 
(Schlesinger, 1958).  
As David Harvey (2007) contends, “The corporatization, commodification, and 
privatization of hitherto public assets have been signal features of the neoliberal project” 
(Harvey, 2007, p.35). After decades of market-led development, which centers on 
creating free markets via reforms including deregulation, market liberalization, and 
decentralization, among other measures, the twenty-first century has been marked by 






(Bello, 2009a; Gamble, 2009; Bello, 2012). Poverty, unemployment, hunger and food 
insecurity are growing globally, particularly after the multiple food crises that followed 
the Great Recession of 2007-8 (Altieri & Toledo, 2011), which further aggravated already 
persistent conditions of social, economic, and environmental insecurity across the planet 
(Gamble, 2009; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; McMichael & Schneider, 2011; Ziegler, 2013). It 
is particularly in countries that have become export-based agricultural producers, where 
the advancement of neoliberal free-market development has made both food producers 
and consumers vulnerable to the volatilities of the global market that the worst of the 
crises are felt (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). Various researchers have observed this to be the 
case. In fact, the food crises of 2007-2008 and 2010 occurred during periods that saw 
historically unprecedented high levels of food production across the planet (Holt-
Giménez, 2009a; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Ziegler, 2013), demonstrating that the scarcity 
of food is not the driving mechanism behind these events.  Many scholars point to the 
lack of economic access, i.e. poverty, to purchase food as the real problem; today most 
people cannot afford to buy food (Madeley, 2002; Poole-Kavana, 2006; Altieri & Toledo, 
2011); 
“Even most “hungry countries” have enough food for all their people right now. 
Many are net exporters of food and other agricultural products” (Poole-Kavana, 
2006, p.1-2). 
Additionally studies have found birth rates across the world to be dropping and in most 






Furthermore, Holly Poole-Kavana (2006) explains that population density within 
countries does not seem to be a factor for the growing level of hunger since even 
countries with smaller populations, such as the Netherlands, have become food exporters 
leading to the rise of domestic food insecurity (Poole-Kavana, 2006).  
Therefore in order to better understand the relationship between food insecurity 
and development, a historical analysis is necessary to examine how alternative 
development agendas have addressed food insecurity in the past. It is for this reason that 
this thesis will be examining the case of Cuba during its special period of 1990-1996, 
where due to external geopolitical factors the nation became isolated from international 
trade and had to restructure its agricultural sector in order to meet the populations’ dietary 
needs (Koont, 2009; Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc., & Acosta-
Valdésd, 2011; Gürcan, 2014).   Additionally, Catherine Murphy (1999) explains that 
within the Cuban context, in accordance with the national development agenda, the state 
had “established food as a basic human right. Much work was done to develop the 
national agricultural sector to increase Cuba’s self-reliance in foodstuffs” (Murphy, 1999, 
p.5). Moreover, the fact that Cuba’s special period took root in the 1990s makes it a 
particularly unique case study since it was during this decade that the neoliberal market-
led development model rapidly grew at the international level, with the assistance of the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the newly formed World 
Trade Organization (WTO) ,which took a special interest in agricultural reform (Roberts, 






movement entered the international stage in opposition to the role of the WTO and its aim 
to advance neoliberal free market globalization (Holt-Giménez, 2009a; McMichael & 
Schneider, 2011).  Since Cuba was cut off from these international economic institutions 
and the international market at the time, and was forced to approach development in a 
new way, particularly in its restructuring of the agricultural sector and the creation of 
state-supported initiatives to secure a sustainable food supply for its population (Koont, 
2008; Gürcan, 2014), it is of particular interest to this study. 
The objective of this thesis is to test the hypothesis that Cuba achieved food 
sovereignty during the special period, the socioeconomic transition from 1990 - 1996, 
through the adoption of agroecology-based food production.  This study will examine 
several factors including the restructuring of the land tenure system, the use of 
agroecological practices in substitution for industrial agricultural production, changes in 
employment trends and work incentives, as well as the introduction of local markets in 
the field of urban agriculture.  The study explores the case of Havana’s urban agriculture. 
In order to evaluate the relationship between these factors and the criteria set forth for 
achieving food sovereignty by the Food Sovereignty paradigm, the Six Pillars of Food 
Sovereignty are operationalized into Karl Polanyi’s theoretical framework, which outlines 
the relationship between societies and markets in which the status of land, labour and 
money are either perceived as commodities or publically owned resources. In this 






which Cuba’s social and economic trends during the special period met the criteria 
fulfilling food sovereignty.   
By demonstrating Cuba’s achievement of food sovereignty analytically, it is 
hoped that this study will further the understanding of alternative models of development 








Theoretical and Methodological Framework 
 
This thesis assesses the degree to which Cuba achieved food sovereignty during 
its special period in accordance with the six pillars of the Food Sovereignty paradigm. 
However since this paradigm’s theoretical foundation is relatively new, this section offers 
a short comparison between the Human Development paradigm and the Food Sovereignty 
paradigm  in order to explain why the former is less applicable to this study. 
 
2.1 Human Development Paradigm  
        The Human Development paradigm takes a human-based approach to development; 
it examines multiple dimensions intrinsic to development. This paradigm was advanced in 
the 1980s and was greatly influenced by scholars such as heterodox economist Amartya 
Sen, as well as the emerging United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development Reports (HDR) that began to be published in the 1990s (UNDP, 2014). The 
Human Development approach provides an alternative to the standard argument of 
development through economic growth; it takes various social factors into consideration 
including population health, education, and unemployment data (UNDP, 2014).  
Although this paradigm is more inclusive of the non-economic factors inherent to 
development; it still maintains the assumption that economic growth is a prerequisite for 






standpoint, reliance on levels of economic growth for the advancement of human 
development is problematic, it raises concerns about the dependency of populations on 
economic growth as well as the ecological limitations to economic growth, among other 
issues, since critics of development schemes argue that the growth model is simply not 
sustainable (McNally, 2006).  
Furthermore, this assumption that economic growth is a necessary component of 
human development does not account for the human development that occurred in Cuba 
during the special period when there was very little evidence of economic growth 
(Aponte-Garcia, 2009).  Therefore it is argued that the Human Development paradigm is 
not well suited for this study since its economic assumptions that economic growth is 
essential to human development contradict the Cuban experience of human development 
without economic growth. 
 
2.2.0 The Food Sovereignty Paradigm  
Cuba’s achievements in advancing societal and ecological welfare during its 
period of hardship make the Food Sovereignty paradigm particularly well suited for the 
purposes of this research.  Although similar to the Human Development paradigm in its 
approach to development from a humanist perspective, the Food Sovereignty paradigm 
differs in that it holds an antagonistic view of the market-led development model. 






development, the Food Sovereignty paradigm assumes that sustainable agriculture and 
ecological recovery are precursors to the advancement of long term human development 
(Altieri & Toledo, 2011).  Moreover, proponents of food sovereignty acknowledge the 
growing body of research, which demonstrates that large-scale industrial agriculture is 
unviable for long term human development; it is argued that small-scale agroecological 
methods of agriculture are the most effective way to secure national food supplies while 
stimulating the recovery of ecosystems (La Via Campesina, 2010), and thus advancing 
human development: 
“Agroecology is providing the scientific, methodological and technological basis 
for a new ‘agrarian revolution’ worldwide (Altieri, 2009, Wezel & Soldat, 2009, 
Wezel et al., 2009, Ferguson & Morales, 2010). Agroecology-based production 
systems are biodiverse, resilient, energetically efficient, socially just and comprise 
the basis of an energy, productive and food sovereignty strategy (Altieri, 1995; 
Gliessman, 1998)” (Altieri & Toledo, 2011, p.587). 
The re-structuring of the agricultural sector from industrial agricultural production 
systems to agroecological production systems is central to food sovereignty (Holt-
Giménez, 2009a; La Via Campesina, 2010; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; McMichael & 
Schneider, 2011); this focus on environmentally sustainable agriculture as the engine of 
human development makes the Food Sovereignty paradigm exceptional. In this sense, the 
Food Sovereignty paradigm differs from other development paradigms that assume 






Sovereignty paradigm assumes that the de-industrialization of the agricultural sector, via 
agrarian reforms in favor of the autonomy of small-scale food producers, coupled with the 
de-commodification of agricultural products, will advance human development and in 
doing so will address growing global trends of hunger and poverty (Holt-Giménez, 
2009a; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; McMichael & Schneider, 2011); 
“Ultimately, to end world hunger, the monopolistic industrial agrifood complex 
will have to be replaced with agroecological and redistributive food systems” 
(Holt-Gimenez, 2009a, p. 155). 
Additionally, proponents of food sovereignty argue that economic and institutional 
restructuring is required to emphasize the role of small-scale food producers instead of 
the role of the financial sector, which has participated in the creation of food insecurity, in 
development agendas (Altieri & Toledo, 2011).   
Food Sovereignty calls for states to re-regulate the agricultural sector, to focus on 
agricultural production for domestic consumption, to ban industrial agricultural methods 
(i.e., the use of chemical inputs, petroleum based machinery, genetically engineered 
seeds, etc.) that threaten ecological sustainability, the stability of food supplies, and 
population health (La Via Campesina, 2010; Altieri & Toledo, 2011).  State-led 
development prioritizing agrarian reform is essential (Murphy, 1999; Koont, 2008) to the 
establishment and success of food sovereignty (La Via Campesina, 2010; Altieri & Funes-
Monzote, 2012). This is because only the state can protect the agricultural sector and the 






volatilities, its role in the commodification of foods, and enablement of commodity 
speculation (Polanyi, 2001; Saul 2005; Davidson, 2009; Ziegler, 2013). 
The Food Sovereignty paradigm contains six pillars which are summarized in 
Table 1 below. Although these pillars may seem normative, and policy-wise daunting, it 
is worth noting that these propositions have been derived from development agendas of 
past eras; they are need-based and reflect the recommendations of the United Nation’s 
International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) 2008 report. Backed by the World Bank and five United Nations 
organizations, assembling findings from more than four hundred scientists and 
development researchers (Holt-Giménez, 2009a), this IAASTD report is arguably the 
most comprehensive study that the international community has released to date, 
acknowledging the rise of global financial , energy and food crises and the root causes, 
which are directly linked to industrial agricultural production and the corporatization of 
the global food supply (McMichael & Schneider, 2011):  
“Stating that ‘business as usual is not an option’, given the combination of 
climate, energy, water and food crises, the IAASTD questions industrial 
agriculture and GM food as the solution to the social and ecological crises 
associated with global agribusiness, on the grounds that markets fail to adequately 
value environmental and social harm …. In order to strengthen and secure the 
future for small farming, IAASTD recommends altering institutional 






to nonhierarchical development models’, building trust and valuing farmer 
knowledge and natural and agricultural biodiversity, as well as seed exchange and 
common resource management systems” (McMichael & Schneider, 2011, p.132). 
This IAASTD report’s validation of the central concerns of the food sovereignty 
argument, along with its recommendations that reflect the six pillars of food sovereignty, 
are highly significant to advancing the Food Sovereignty paradigm as an alternative 
model of development. In a sense, this report which was released midst the global Great 
Recession, acknowledges the failure of free market-solutions to meet global human, 
social, and environmental needs: 
“With respect to ‘multifunctionality’, IAASTD offers a holistic vision of forms of 
agro-ecology in which regeneration of natural carbon cycles, and goals of food 
and nutritional security, outweigh the conventional path of agricultural 
development and its narrow focus on increasing agricultural crop productivity, 
including the use of biotechnological solutions….IAASTD actually reinforces the 
critique and advocacy of the food sovereignty movement, by recommending 
strengthening local and regional food systems, democratising food policy, and 
prioritising the needs of small farmers by securing access to productive resources 
(seeds, land, water), credit, information, market infrastructures and fair trade 
systems.82 (McMichael & Schneider, 2011, p.133) 






“Under the heading ‘Options Exist’ the IAASTD report maps out a general 
strategy to strengthen food system resilience in the face of environmental crises—
including promoting agro-ecological practices with ‘triple-bottomline’ goals, full-
cost accounting to incorporate energy, health and environmental costs and, 
importantly, a rights-based framework, which is at odds with a market-centric 
organisation of the agriculture and food system” (McMichael & Schneider 2011, 
p.133). 
This human rights-based framework is what the six pillars of the Food Sovereignty 
paradigm are designed to ensure. In fact, proponents argue that food sovereignty cannot 
be achieved unless these six pillars are realized. Moreover, the Six Pillars of Food 
Sovereignty acknowledge the power dynamics and root economic causes shaping the 
global issues that the paradigm aims to address by offering ecologically sound, culturally 
sensitive solutions that are anticipated to be modified to reflect the needs and resources of 
communities within individual countries (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). However in order to 
successfully implement this food sovereignty model, proponents argue that there needs to 
be a serious shift in development priorities - to transfer the onus of development back to 
the state because only the state has the tools to manage the market in a way that protects 
populations’ basic human rights, including protection of national food supplies (La Via 








Table 1. Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty 
 Pillars of                       
Food 
Sovereignty 





Food  for 
People 
 
Food sovereignty puts the right to 
sufficient, healthy and culturally 
appropriate food for all individuals, 
peoples and communities, 
including those who are hungry, 
under occupation, in conflict zones 
and marginalized, at the centre of 
food, agriculture, livestock and 
fisheries policies; and rejects the 
proposition that food is just another 
commodity or component for 
international agri-business* 
 
• De-commodify food and re-
define food as a human right 
(Murphy, 1999) 
•  
• Ensure that policies prioritize 
the human need and right for 
food (Murphy, 1999; 
Murphy, 2008). 
•  
• Officially establish that food 
is central to human existence 
and legally protect it from 
market forces, i.e. from 
corporate interests (Murphy, 
2008; McMichael & 
Schneider, 2011) 
•  
• Remove food from the realm 
of commodity speculation 
(McMichael & Schneider, 
2011; Ziegler, 2013) 
 
Restore state-run agricultural 
marketing boards and 
publicly-owned national 
grain reserves (Holt-
Giménez, 2008;  Rosset, 
2008) 
 

















Food sovereignty values and 
supports the contributions, and 
respects the rights, of women and 
men, peasants and small scale 
family farmers, pastoralists, 
artisanal fisher folk, forest 
dwellers, indigenous peoples and 
agricultural and fisheries workers, 
including migrants, who cultivate, 
grow, harvest and process food; 
and rejects those policies, actions 
and programmes that undervalue 
them, threaten their livelihoods and 
eliminate them* 
 
• Implement national policies 
that support the livelihoods 
of small scale, sustainable 
producers and their right to 
access land and other 
resources (Altieri &Toledo, 
2011). 
•  
• Implement national policies 
to protect and promote 
women’s rights (Patel, 2012). 
•  
• Promote societal re-valuation 




markets to end food 
speculation (Altieri & 










Food sovereignty brings food 
providers and consumers closer 
together; puts providers and 
consumers at the centre of 
decision-making on food issues; 
protects food providers from the 
dumping of food and food aid in 
local markets; protects consumers 
from poor quality and unhealthy 
food, inappropriate food aid and 
food tainted with genetically 
modified organisms; and resists 
governance structures, agreements 
and practices that depend on and 
promote unsustainable and 
inequitable international trade and 
give power to remote and 
•  
Implement national policies 
that prevent TNCs from 
dumping food products in 
domestic markets (Roberts, 
2008; Rosset, 2009c). 
 
Implement national policies 
to protect domestic resources 
and food supplies from 
corporate interests (Saul, 
2005), in order to prevent the 
formation of national 
dependencies on 




• Reduce the distance food 












• Establish national initiatives 
to prevent inappropriate food 









Food sovereignty places control 
over territory, land, grazing, water, 
seeds, livestock and fish 
populations on local food providers 
and respects their rights. They can 
use and share them in socially and 
environmentally sustainable ways 
which conserve diversity; it 
recognizes that local territories 
often cross geopolitical borders and 
ensures the right of local 
communities to inhabit and use 
their territories; it promotes 
positive interaction between food 
providers in different regions and 
territories and from different 
sectors that helps resolve internal 
conflicts or conflicts with local and 
national authorities; and rejects the 
privatization of natural resources 
through laws, commercial contracts 
and intellectual property rights 
regimes* 
•  
• Restructure agricultural 
schemes to allow control of 
local resources by local 
small-scale producers 
(Altieri & Toledo, 2011). 
•  
• Implement national 
initiatives to stop and reverse 
privatization of natural 
resources, i.e. water, land, 
seeds (Saul, 2005).  
•  
• End land privatization to 
prevent land grabs (Torrez, 
2011). 
•  
• Land redistribution: 
Implement national 
initiatives to enable the 
return of displaced peasant 
and agricultural populations 












Food sovereignty builds on the 
skills and local knowledge of food 
providers and their local 
organizations that conserve, 
develop and manage localized food 
•  
• Nationally promote the 
revival of traditional 
knowledge, especially in 
regards to regional food 
production methods (Altieri 






production and harvesting systems, 
developing appropriate research 
systems to support this and passing 
on this wisdom to future 
generations; and rejects 
technologies that undermine, 




• Build and expand community 
resources to advance 
traditional agricultural skills 




• Reject technologies that 
undermine or contaminate 
local food systems (i.e. 
genetically modified 
organisms, chemical inputs, 








Food sovereignty uses the 
contributions of nature in diverse, 
low external input agroecological 
production and harvesting methods 
that maximize the contribution of 
ecosystems and improve resilience 
and adaptation, especially in the 
face of climate change; it seeks to 
heal the planet so that the planet 
may heal us; and, rejects methods 
that harm beneficial ecosystem 
functions, that depend on energy 
intensive monocultures and 
livestock factories, destructive 
fishing practices and other 
industrialized production methods, 
which damage the environment and 




based food production and 
distribution systems, which 
are ecologically sound (La 
Via Campesina, 2010). 
•  
End the use of energy and 
technology intensive 
monoculture-based, 
industrial methods of 
agricultural production, 
including Green Revolution 
technologies and methods 




 * The description column is reproduced from www.usc-canada.org/UserFiles/File/SixPillars_Nyeleni.pdf 
 
Although some countries have made policy changes and reforms that reflect some 






achieving food sovereignty (Rosset, 2009a). This is because international economic 
institutions, which are working to expand the free market neoliberal agenda, create 
impediments that prevent nation-states from making the necessary reforms (Harvey, 
2005) that would enable national food sovereignty, i.e. structural adjustment programs 
pressure nations to privatize land, industrialize the agricultural sector, etc. (Veltmeyer, 
2007); these issues are further discussed in Chapter three. Arguably the only country that 
has achieved significant food sovereignty, which was made possible via state-supported 
initiatives, has been Cuba during its special period. 
  In order to consider the feasibility of these pillars of food sovereignty, this 
research will look at the case of Cuba’s special period where the country was in a state of 
disconnect from the global market and from its trading partners and therefore it had to 
reformulate agricultural food production in order to protect the survival of the nation 
(Aponte-Garcia, 2009; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, 
Lastra-Bravoc., & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011). For this reason, Cuba’s special period offers an 
exceptional case study for the topic of food sovereignty. 
 
2.2.1. The discourse of the Food Sovereignty Movement 
The origin of the Food Sovereignty paradigm is rooted in the food sovereignty 
movement , which consists of small-scale farmers,  peasant groups and community 






to the destruction that the free market neoliberal development agenda was creating for 
small-scale food producers (Bello, 2009b). This movement has grown internationally over 
the past thirty years as more communities have become affected by the expansion of free 
market reforms (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). In a very real sense, the food sovereignty 
position has emerged as a form of grassroots resistance to the market-led neoliberal 
model of development and its market-solution based food security argument (Bello, 
2009b). The food sovereignty argument includes a strong normative discourse which 
encompasses issues ranging from the working conditions of food producers to the 
recognition of the cultural significance of food, with the overall aim of transforming the 
global system of food production, distribution and consumption.  However the main 
emphasis remains that food is a human right and must be protected as such (La Via 
Campesina, 2010): 
“Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate 
food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their 
right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, 
distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than 
the demands of markets and corporations. It defends the interests and inclusion of 
the next generation. 
It offers a strategy to resist and dismantle the current corporate trade and food 
regime, and directions for food, farming, pastoral and fisheries systems 






economies and markets and empowers peasant and family farmer-driven 
agriculture, artisanal fishing, pastoralist led grazing, and food production, 
distribution and consumption based on environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. Food sovereignty promotes transparent trade that guarantees just 
income to all peoples and the rights of consumers to control their food and 
nutrition. It ensures that the rights to use and manage our lands, territories, waters, 
seeds, livestock and biodiversity are in the hands of those of us who produce food. 
Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality 
between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations” 
(La Via Campesina, 2010). 
The issues raised by the food sovereignty movement deal with matters such as poverty, 
women’s rights, community health, food production, industrial and trade regimes, cultural 
identity, biodiversity and environmental protection, the role of states, markets, as well as  
the role of communities in the global food system.  
 
2.3 Parallels between Food Sovereignty discourse and Karl Polanyi’s political 
economy framework 
Taking into consideration that the Food Sovereignty paradigm is a relatively new 
construct and thus it is still possibly in formation, it is helpful to supplement its approach 






framework for unveiling the structural determinants, such as the expansion of markets, 
agro-food Transnational Corporations (TNC), and such concerns that have given rise to 
the issues presented. The production of food in itself for example, raises the question of 
for whom production is intended, and whether it is for direct use by peoples or for the 
purpose of exchange in markets. The latter raises further questions about the nature of 
commodities in general and to what extent food can be treated as a commodity given its 
centrality to basic human survival as well as to social, cultural and political dimensions 
inherent to its production and consumption. In order to explore such inquiries, what is 
needed is a theoretical framework with explanatory variables capable of showing how the 
descriptive themes outlined above connect with and arise from broader political economy 
determinants.   
In critically examining the six pillars of the Food Sovereignty paradigm and their 
rationality, it is apparent that there is a central antagonism between the interests of small-
scale food producers, along with the interests of the broader segments of society as food 
consumers and states playing intermediary roles, that is set against corporate interests, 
free markets and the commercial production and trade of food. From a Polanyian position 
then, it can be said that there is a conflict between free markets and societies (Polanyi, 
2001). In particular, proponents of food sovereignty criticize corporate systems of food 
production and the exploitative power relations inherent to them, the commodified trade 
of food to meet global market demands, as well as the ramifications of these practices 






ascribed to food, as well as the environmental repercussions that this global system of 
industrial food production generates (McNally, 2006; Murphy, 2008; McMichael & 
Schneider, 2011). The general theme to be observed from the food sovereignty position is 
to end the commodification of the production, exchange, and consumption of food, as this 
process allows for the expansion of markets into the sacred domains of life (McNally, 
2006).  In accordance with this rationale, this study will utilize the concept of commodity 
as a political economy heuristic as a starting point to build a theoretical framework which 
places the Food Sovereignty paradigm within the broader conflict between markets and 
societies. Such a heuristic in fact can be successfully employed in the social economy 
framework of Karl Polanyi. 
The social economy framework of Karl Polanyi emphasizes the relationship 
between markets and societies, the framework’s clear articulation of the modes of 
economic integration and its polemic on the destructive effects of the commodification 
process makes it ideal for conceptualizing the recent ascent of the Food Sovereignty 
paradigm within a broader political economy perspective. Additionally, Polanyi’s 
perspective on development is reflected in the rationale of the food sovereignty argument; 
as Kari Polanyi Levitt explains, Karl Polanyi does not agree with the conceptualization of 
development through an economic lens:  
“…the problem, he said, was how to institute a continuous supply of the material 
requirements of life given our knowledge of industrial technology, without the 






prime characteristic of what he chose to call the self-regulating market economy 
…” (Levitt, 2013, p.119). 
Polanyi’s argument that societies need to be protected from the precariousness of free 
markets is reflected in the food sovereignty argument as well. Also, Polanyi’s social 
economy framework offers a broad range of heuristic tools, such as the concept of 
‘fictitious commodities,’ which can be used to operationalize the normative themes of the 
food sovereignty argument in more analytical terms which are often overlooked by 
conventional economic theories (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001). 
As Polanyi has noted there is a distinction between the formal economy, which 
encompasses the subject matter of classical economic theory, and the substantive 
economy, which encompasses broader socioeconomic concepts such as livelihoods 
(Polanyi, 1968). Polanyi’s definition of the substantive economy, as stated by George 
Dalton (1968) in the introduction to Primitive, Archaic, and Modern Economies, is “…the 
need for all communities-whatever their size and technology – to organize material life so 
as to assure the sustained, repetitive provision of food, shelter, and the items necessary for 
community life” (Polanyi,1968, p. xv-xvi).  Dalton’s emphasis on the irrelevance of a 
‘community’s’ size and level of technological development, for this working definition of 
a substantive economy, which is in line with Polanyi’s broader conception of the 
economy as a universally invariant framework across societies” (Polanyi, 2001).  
Within Polanyi’s framework, for any given society the economy is incorporated 






redistribution, or exchange (Polanyi, 1968). Traditionally, within any one of these forms 
of economic integration, the economy is so entirely shaped by the social customs and 
institutions of a given society that it is indistinguishable from the other culturally-defined 
components of society. As Polanyi states, 
“The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic 
and non-economic. The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For religion or 
government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy 
as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and machines themselves that 
lighten the toil of labour” (Polanyi, 1968, p.148) (emphasis added). 
The embedded economy then, regardless of its mode of incorporation, constitutes the 
most stable social and economic arrangement for a given society. This is because the 
incentives for engaging in productive activity are mediated through social customs and 
cultural initiatives rather than through ‘economic’ objectives or through the compulsion 
of necessity. For Polanyi, of the three modes of economic integration, the mode of market 
exchange contains the greatest potential for destabilizing the relationship between 
societies and their economies. This is because markets, as points of “contacts between 
buyers and sellers” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 31) are economic institutions with the least social 
obligations, giving them the potential and probability to dis-embed from the rest of 
society and adopt altogether different initiatives that may not be in the society’s best 






When a society begins to separate its sphere of economic activities from its social 
and political sphere, through what Polanyi refers to as “market elements” (Polanyi, 1968, 
p.170), there is a transformation of social relations, that reflect the structural changes of 
the economic sector, which gives rise to a market society that is then capable of creating 
and fostering a (free) market economy. For Polanyi, a market society, and its ensuing 
market economy, is inherently unstable because the creation of a self-regulating market 
results in the dis-embedding of the economy from the social institutions of society 
(Polanyi, 1968). The economic dynamics of the dis-embedded economy no longer 
conform to the practical needs of societies, but instead to the laws of supply and demand, 
thereby forsaking the production of goods for their use-value in favor of production of 
commodities for their exchange-value in the global market. As Polanyi states, “[t]he 
extreme artificiality of market economy is rooted in the fact that the process of production 
itself is here organized in the form of buying and selling” (Polanyi, 1968, p.33). In other 
words, with the rise of a market economy, the question of what is produced, how much is 
produced, and the purpose of production come to be determined by the market as opposed 
to the actual needs of society (Polanyi, 1968).  
As discussed earlier, this loss of sovereign decision-making on matters of 
production and consumption on the part of society are in fact the central issues that the 
Food Sovereignty paradigm aims to address.  The methodological challenge that emerges 
in examining these issues through a political economy framework is in identifying and 






societies where people engage in multiple forms and scales of economic activities 
depending upon their cultural and political environment (Polanyi, 1968). This is 
particularly challenging when examining societies that are undergoing, or have 
undergone, an overall socioeconomic transformation such as in our case study of Cuba 
during the special period. In order to address these methodological issues, we need to 
frame our analysis of Cuba’s socioeconomic transition within an analytical framework in 
which distinct variables can act as signals, or indicators of a shift in patterns of economic 
activity. 
 
2.4.0 Polanyi’s analytical categories of fictitious commodities 
To address such inquiries, Polanyi has expanded upon the concept of commodity as an 
analytical category for measuring the extent to which societies fall under the directives of 
the market. This is how Polanyi outlines this empirical framework, 
“Commodities are here empirically defined as objects produced for sale on the 
market; markets again, are empirically defined as actual contacts between buyers 
and sellers. Accordingly, every element of industry is regarded as having been 
produced for sale, as then and then only will it be subject to the supply-and-
demand mechanism interacting with price” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 31)  
For Polanyi then, true commodities are products and services that are originally produced 






communally-owned lands or affective care within households, that can be made to 
respond to the laws of supply and demand but which were never intended to be bought 
and sold in the market. For Polanyi such products and services are fictitious commodities, 
or  false commodities, because although they can be commodified into exchange-value in 
the market, the fact that they were never intended for such a purpose in the first place 
creates unforeseen social consequences should they be turned into commodities (Polanyi, 
1968).  
 In addition, Polanyi distinguishes between two classes of fictitious commodities; 
land-nature and labour which are inherently tied to people’s social identities, and a third, 
money, which is a medium of transaction that was not meant to become a commodity in-
itself (Polanyi, 1968). For Polanyi, the degree of commodification of these fictitious 
commodities acts as an indicator for the degree to which the economy is embedded in 
society. This is because the rise of a disembedded self-regulating market economy takes 
place through this commodification process, i.e. privatization. This commodification of 
fictitious commodities gives rise to a self-regulating market in property and rent (of land-
nature), human activity (labour), and financial capital (money). The full commodification 
of these fictitious commodities is an indicator of the creation of a market society through 
the rise of market economy (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001).  
Polanyi’s three categories of fictitious commodities provide the basis for 
constructing an analytical framework based on the operationalization of the key themes of 






modes of economic integration and the dis-embedding of the economy from society.  The 
next section will examine these three analytical concepts more closely and determine their 
relationship to the food sovereignty argument.  
 
2.4.1. Land - nature 
In terms of Land-nature as fictitious commodity, Polanyi explains that, “land is 
another name for nature, which is not produced by man” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 32); therefore 
it cannot be viewed as a real commodity. Land-nature is the primary basis for the 
production of use value for human livelihoods (Polanyi, 1968); furthermore it is the 
material dimension that social realities of culture, relationships and constructions of 
reality are rooted in (McNally, 2006). As Polanyi explains, land-nature is autonomous 
from the exchange-values placed on it by the market, since as an element of nature that is 
crucial for the most basic subsistence of human beings, its use forms the basis for 
humanity’s existence. Since it is not “produced for sale on the market” (Polanyi, 2001, 
p.75) to begin with, it can be used sustainably to meet social needs, or overused to 
maximize exchange value where it can jeopardize the entire human-nature relationship 
which markets rely on. As such, land and nature do not fit into Polanyi’s empirical 
definition of a true commodity (Polanyi, 1968). 
The unregulated exchange of land, in the form of rent and sale, in a market 






relationship between humanity and nature threatens to become unsustainable when it is 
put under the command of the market. This disruption applies not only to land itself, but 
also to the unsustainable extraction of natural resources from the land (Polanyi, 2001; 
McClintock, 2010). Similarly, two of the key themes of the Six Pillars of Food 
Sovereignty, localizing food systems and adopting sustainable methods of agricultural 
production (Patel, 2012), reinforce the intricate relationship between humanity and nature 
by prioritizing the actual use value of land in localized food production, over its 
disembedded exchange value in the market, as well as changing the mode of production 
to sustainable methods in order to harmonize society’s material needs for production with 
the limits of what nature can provide. 
On a secondary level, the commodification of land also has the potential to 
destabilize society by introducing or entrenching social hierarchies through 
disproportionate ownership schemes for land which can lead to social volatility if land 
ownership is strictly tied to market prices in land rather than in social institutions 
(Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001). Moreover, four of the Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty 
(food production for human consumption, localization of food systems, local control of 
resources, working with nature) are rooted in the argument for egalitarian reforms of 
agricultural lands (Rosset, Sosa, Jaime & Lozano, 2011). Synergistically, this argument 
for the de-commodification of land also conforms to Polanyi’s prescription of re-
embedding markets, i.e. land, back into social institutions; in this case the redistribution 






of it by generating use value, i.e. nurturing and sustaining communities, as well as the 
natural environment (Rosset, 2009a; Patel, 2012). 
 
2.4.2. Labour 
In his work Polanyi articulates labour, as well as the concept of class, within the 
broader concept of culture (Polanyi, 1968). One reason for this is because for Polanyi, 
labour cannot be reduced to a parsimonious economic variable without reducing its 
explanatory power in accounting for social phenomena and so he contends that all of 
labour’s social elements must be taken into account, not just its status as a source of 
economic productivity. This includes subjective values that can include non-economic 
motives such as a sense of social responsibility, communal pride and human dignity 
(Polanyi, 1968).This culturalist approach marks a distinction between Polanyi’s 
conception of labour and that of the classical economic theory or other political economy 
traditions, which focus exclusively upon the economic role of labour in the process of 
generating profit. Synchronously, Polanyi’s culturalist conception of labour corresponds 
to the other two of the Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty: the legitimation of small-scale 
food producer’s labour (value) and the legitimation of traditional sustainable food 
production knowledge and skills, along with the movement’s broad-spectrum demand for 
culturally appropriate food and food production methods (Altieri &Toledo, 2011). Within 
Polanyi’s conceptualization of labour, subjective factors such as societal value, communal 






function. The indivisibility of subjective social factors from economic ones is further 
emphasized by Polanyi’s remark that “for the alleged commodity “labour power” cannot 
be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the 
human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity”(Polanyi, 
1968, p.33). 
Moreover, Polanyi’s articulation of labour through culture reflects his argument 
that culture is the medium that maintains and reproduces the institutions of society; these 
societal institutions are fully capable of sustaining peoples’ livelihoods and in keeping 
market forces, should they develop, in check (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001).  This 
argument is reflected in the Food Sovereignty paradigm’s assessment that sustainable 
agrarian reform and ecological recovery are the driving forces (McMichael & Schneider, 
2011) of development since they strengthen communities; build sustainable livelihoods, 
as well as larger societies that can maintain human and ecological wellbeing.  
Additionally, Polanyi explains that the encroachment of the market economy 
within the context of any given culture has the potential to unsettle or completely 
undermine its previous systems of livelihoods and communal practices inherited across 
generations (Polanyi, 1968). As Polanyi states,  
“These institutions are disrupted by the very fact that a market economy is foisted 
upon an entirely differently organized community; labor and land are made into 
commodities, which, again, is only a short formula for the liquidation of every and 






From Polanyi’s position, cultural resources protect societies from the destabilization that 
market forces introduce. Therefore embedding labour into society as a component of 
cultural practice, as opposed to relegating it as a dis-embedded unit of the economy, is 
essential for societal wellbeing. This is why Polanyi finds “cultural degeneration” 
(Polanyi, 1968, p. 49) through the commodification of labour and the subsequent loss of 
previous ways of life a greater travesty then the imbalances of economic exploitation, for 
once “robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would 
perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social 
dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation” (Polanyi, 2001, p.76). 
Cultural and political institutions then, are crucial for keeping the market embedded 
within society.  
Using Polanyi’s frame of analysis, Mark Blyth (2005) contends that the 
underlying basis for the advancement of post-World War II welfare state-led development 
projects in Western nations was based on a socioeconomic convergence towards social 
democratic outcomes, where “Social democracy emerged then as a reaction to the market, 
with decommodification as its core strategy…through the deployment of a series of 
decommodificatory institutions” (Blyth, 2005, p. 383). While Blyth lists monetary 
control, credit creation policies and regulations as the key decommodifactory institutions 
for embedding the economy back into society, a detailed reading of Polanyi’s theories, as 
above, also indicates the centrality of cultural institutions and practices for keeping 
market forces in check and further engraining these institutions as cultural values. 






epiphenomenal subjective factors,but rather key components that form the normative 
basis of values that maintain social cohesion, which people orient their lives around. 
 
2.4.3. Money 
The third fictitious commodity, money, is a unique topic of discussion. As Polanyi 
explains, “actual money…is merely a token of purchasing power which, as a rule, is not 
produced at all, but comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance” 
(Polanyi, 1968, p. 32). This observation is based on Polanyi’s theory of the “purchasing 
power economy”(Polanyi, 2001, p.206) as an alternative to Ricardo’s theory of money as 
a holder of gold value in token form that can be bartered and exchanged just like any 
other commodity (Polanyi, 2001, p. 205). In Polanyi’s ideal-type of an economy based on 
money, money itself does not hold any value, nor does it exist as a representative token of 
the value of another commodity such as gold (Polanyi, 2001, p. 205-206). Rather, money 
is a token for purchasing power, a means of payment, not a holder of commodity value. 
To illustrate this point, Polanyi presents the following scenario: 
“Let us try to imagine a “society” in which every individual is endowed with a 
definite amount of purchasing power, enabling him to claim goods each item of 
which is provided with a price tag. Money in such an economy is not a 
commodity; it has no usefulness itself; its only use is to purchase goods to which 






Interestingly, the assumptions of Polanyi’s purchasing power model, such as the 
endowment of purchasing power, appear to also correspond to Sen’s theory of 
entitlements, which we will examine in later chapters. Both theories focus on the ways 
that monetary transactions are used as use values to meet social needs.  
From the perspective of Polanyi’s purchasing power theory of money then, money 
as a medium of financial transaction does not possess the qualities of a commodity, as 
empirically defined by Polanyi as being something that is bought and sold itself. Money 
is the means through which such a transaction is enabled to take place. In his historical 
analysis of the crises of the free market order prior to World War II, Polanyi made a 
distinction between the traditional systems of token money used for exchange in local 
economies, and the rise of commodity money in the form of the global Gold Standard 
(Polanyi, 2001). While nations were able to retain control of their domestic currencies in 
which money did act as a simple token for purchasing power, “foreign trade and the gold 
standard had undisputed priority over the needs of domestic business” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 
203), particularly since the supply of gold within any specific nation could not be 
increased or decreased at will, but had to conform to global standards through 
mechanisms such as currency devaluations. For Polanyi this raised a key problem: 
“commodity money was vital to the existence of foreign trade; token money, to the 
existence of domestic trade. How far did they agree with each other?” (Polanyi, 2001, p. 
203). Polanyi answers this question by noting how “with the disintegration of the gold 






purchasing power concept of money should replace it” (Polanyi 2001:206), corresponding 
to the rise of autarchy during the interwar period. Additionally, Polanyi’s central 
argument in The Great Transformation (1944) is twofold. First, the rise of a disembedded 
self-regulating global market economy based on the gold standard at the turn of the 
twentieth century created social tensions which developed into the political crises that 
gave rise to fascism across Europe. Second, the underlying basis for these crises were due 
to the fact that any self-regulating market economy is inherently unsustainable (Polanyi, 
2001).  It is possible to draw parallels between Polanyi’s observations about the ascent of 
the global self-regulating market economy and the many global crises that have marked 
the twenty-first century thus far. This has also been the era that saw the birth of the food 
sovereignty movement, and its demand for regulated markets can be seen as a response to 
the global monetary order, which is in line with Polanyi’s observations of the societal 
response that re-initiated the de-commodified token conception of money after the 
collapse of the gold standard-based liberal monetary order in the earlier part of the 
twentieth century (Polanyi, 2001).   
 
2.5 Operationalizing the Food Sovereignty Discourse into analytical categories 
Karl Polanyi’s theoretical concepts provide a useful framework for 
operationalizing themes from the Food Sovereignty paradigm. As we have seen the key 
arguments made by food sovereignty converge on the central antagonism between the 






interests of industrial agriculture, open markets and unregulated trade in food as a 
commodity. Much like the fictitious commodities of land-nature, labour and money, 
Polanyi’s conceptual framework challenges the commodified status of food as it is the 
very lifeblood for livelihoods. Polanyi’s framework also encourages a clearer articulation 
of this antagonism within a broader structural scope, as the tension between markets and 
societies. First, Table 2 frames the Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty into the context of 
Polanyi’s fictitious commodities. These six pillars will then be tested in chapter four, to 
see if during the special period Cuba fulfilled the criteria to achieve food sovereignty. 
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• Localize Food Systems (local production for local consumption). 
 
• Put Control Locally (localized, small-scale, sustainable food 
production). 
 







• Value Food Providers (legitimate the role of small-scale food 
producers to social wellbeing). 
 
• Build Knowledge and Skills (of traditional cultural practices and 






 Focus on Food for People (which requires de-linking the value of 










Referring to Table 2, it is possible to see that most of the prerequisites for the food 
sovereignty criteria involve the de-commodification of land, which is central to both the 
food sovereignty agenda and Polanyi’s argument that de-commodification of fictitious 
commodities is essential to shielding society from the instability of free markets (Polanyi, 
2001). 
 By and large, Polanyi’s key heuristic – fictitious commodity – allows for an 
analytical assessment of the degree to which the market is embedded within a given 
society and whereby the degree of embedded-ness acts as an indicator of how a given 
society has been structured, i.e. whether it is structured to primarily meet the needs of 
citizens or the needs of markets. In order to arrive at such an analytical framework 
however, we must proceed to further operationalize Polanyi’s three fictitious 
commodities along a scale ranging from examples of full commodification of a given 
fictitious commodity, denoting its dis-embedment, to the other extreme of full 
socialization of the fictitious commodity. Table 3 provides an overview of the range of 
























(i.e. land grabs) 
All public and most 
private land holdings 







Wage-labour as the 
primary or only 
means of livelihood  
Wage-labour and 
public provisions as 
equal sources of 






















A gift-based economy 
(i.e. system of 
exchange) based on 
the notion of 
reciprocity 
 
Referring to Table 3, it is evident that the full commodification of all three fictitious 
commodity categories of land-nature, labour, and money, which is central to the 






correlated with Polanyi’s market society that he argues is the most volatile of the three 
society types because the market is fully disembedded and can devastate society (Polanyi, 
2001).  
It can be argued that this analysis offers a fair explanation for the various crises 
that have so far shaken the twenty-first century, where most countries have become free 
market societies to varying degrees. For instance, prior to the special period, Cuba would 
have fallen under the semi-commodified category. The semi-commodified/semi-
socialized manner in which the fictitious commodities of land, labour, and money were 
put to use in the “actually existing” socialist states, as a defining feature of the system of 
central planning, hence the term “socialization” as traditionally applied for characterizing 
the centralization of economic sectors under central planning in fact refers to, in our 
framework, to semi-commodified/semi-socialized ideal-types. Within our analytical 
framework, socialization refers to an ideal-type characterized by societies in which the 
use of the three fictitious commodities is decentralized and often placed under localized 
forms of decision-making in regards to reciprocal social obligations towards resource 
allocation. In the case of Cuba’s transition away from central planning while formally 
eschewing the free market, the food shortage crises of the special period did not allow 
Cuba’s transition towards the full socialization of the fictitious commodities since 
regulated free markets were needed to activate new entitlement channels (Sen, 1981) to 
allow for the streamlining of resource allocation. These markets were re-opened in 1994 






producers to increase productivity, as they were permitted to sell surplus food products on 
the free markets (Gürcan, 2014).  As for the full de-commodification/socialization of 
fictitious commodities, there has not been a social system, current or historical, that has 
been able to conform to this mode where all three fictitious commodities have been 
collectively maintained; therefore the example for this mode is derived from a cross-
cultural example of the gift economy of the Trobriad islanders, which has been 
intensively analyzed by Polanyi (Polanyi, 2001).  
Having further operationalized Polanyi’s three fictitious commodities along a 
scale of commodification, we have constructed an analytical framework for assessing the 
relationship between markets and societies. Along with our operationalization of the Six 
Pillars from the Food Sovereignty paradigm into the categories of fictitious commodities, 
this analytical framework will be used to evaluate the degree to which Cuba’s system of 
urban agriculture during the special period conforms to the mandate set forth by the 
themes of the food sovereignty argument.  
The following chapter offers a literature reviews of the core arguments 
surrounding the food security versus food sovereignty debate, the causes of food 
insecurity, as well as central concepts including the concept of food security, food 
sovereignty, agroecology, and urban agriculture. Finally, the chapter will cover some 
significant background details regarding the Polanyian framework, followed by an 








The Relationship between Food Insecurity and 
Development Agendas: A Literature Review  
This chapter is a literature review examining the relationship between markets, 
development projects and food insecurity, which is critical for comprehension of the Food 
Sovereignty paradigm.  
 
3.1 Development Agendas Directly Impact Food Insecurity 
The twentieth century saw the growth of a massive surplus in global food 
supplies, as well as in wealth across nations (Gardner & Halweil, 2000). Paradoxically, 
this trend corresponded with the rise of global hunger and malnutrition at a pace that had 
never been seen before, and in 2000, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
approximated that about 3 billion people from then-global population of 6 billion, lived 
with some level of malnutrition (Gardner & Halweil, 2000).  Having been left 
unaddressed, a decade and a half later the issue has turned into full-grown global food 
crises.  Many academics contend that these food crises are one branch of the ongoing 
financial crisis that is rooted in the neoliberal market-led development model (Harcourt, 






In the era of neoliberalism the notion of development is often tied to the 
advancement of the neoliberal free market agenda, yet this has not always been the case. 
There are various ways to approach the idea of development; within the field of 
development studies however it is generally accepted that development is a human-made 
project, often backed by various forms of capital and special-interests, rather than as an 
evolutionary process of culture or societal organization (Veltmeyer, 2007).  Originally, 
development was approached as a method to advance the human condition by promoting 
economic growth (Veltmeyer & Rushton, 2013).  The notion of development as project 
began to take form after World War II as nation-states worked to rebuild war-ravaged 
countries and to advance particular political aims. Consequently, development projects 
were initiated by both capitalist and socialist societies, often under the banner of human 
development (Veltmeyer & Rushton, 2013). As Ha-Joon Chang (2004) explains, the role 
of the state has been pivotal to the initiation and management of development projects 
that defined the rationale, structure and direct economic functions of development 
initiatives (Chang, 2004). The post-World War II era was a time of great change, not only 
was the first tangible socialist project expanding from within the Soviet Union, but so too 
were capitalist development projects that aimed to advance capitalist economics (Chang, 
2004). The 1950s and 1960s saw massive decolonization efforts take place among 
countries in the Global South; consequently capitalist nations in the Global North began 
pushing for the creation of human development projects to offer decolonizing countries 
an alternative to the socialist development model being promoted (Veltmeyer & Rushton, 






positioning of workers - who became highly prioritized by governments due to the view 
that the advancement of fascist ideology that had led to the Second World War was 
rooted in the occurrence of the Great Depression, which had undermined economic and 
social stability across the world, particularly for the working classes (Chang, 2004). This 
awareness promoted the utilization of Keynesian economic which aimed to improve 
living conditions throughout society; this included intervention by governments to 
promote the availability and accessibility of food within nations, as well as the promotion 
of public ownership of national resources (Roberts, 2008). Consequently the advancement 
of Keynesian economics through policy initiatives led to what has been called the 
“Golden Age” of capitalism (Chang, 2004, p. 19). Within industrialized countries, this 
economic model was implemented by means of greater regulation of the private sector 
and market mechanisms (Saul, 2005; Davidson, 2009), government spending on public 
services, as well as the enactment of higher wages and progressive taxation that not only 
funded public spending measures but also enabled the majority of the population to 
participate as consumers in the economic process (Veltmeyer, 2007). 
Similarly, the implementation of such measures was quite visible in many 
industrializing countries where states had become more heavily involved in economic and 
social organization (Chang, 2004). Consequently in most cases in the Global South, 
industries and businesses, including banks, were owned by states, i.e. the public sector.  
Chang argues that the state’s management of the economic sector is a major contributing 






development within countries of the Global South (Chang, 2004). Development scholar 
Henry Veltmeyer explains that this was indeed the case, 
“In the 1950s, 1960s and into the 1970s, the structured inequalities in income 
distribution were on the decline, the result of an economic model and 
developmental states that slowly incorporated workers, producers and the middle 
class into the economic development process, providing improvements in their 
access to society’s productive resources and to government social and 
development programs” (Veltmeyer, 2007, p.30). 
The human and social gains made during this post-World War II Golden Age of state-led 
development were many (Saul, 2005; Veltmeyer, 2007), but did not last after state-led 
development was abandoned in 1970 and a model of market-led development was 
embraced, which was then globalized in the 1980s (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2003).   As 
James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer explain,  
“Comparing the 1960-80 period (under the old model of state-led development) to 
1980-2000 (under the neoliberal order), the Washington-based Centre for 
Economic and Policy Research looked at changes in economic growth, plus 
health, education and other social indicators, for 116 countries. After sorting 
countries into five categories based on common starting points, they found that 
economic growth rates for all five groups were much lower in the second period 
than the first. In fact, the poorest group went from average per capita GDP growth 






education indicators, so marked in the first period (see Patel 1995) was reduced 
for most countries, especially those subjected to neoliberal policy and structural 
reforms. In this connection poverty is bound to rise and has done so, as the state 
retreats from its economic development and social welfare role, and social 
programs are privatized” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2003, p.5). 
This point is highly significant since health and education are major indicators of social 
progress; therefore their global decline suggests living standards are also on the decline, 
which has been abundantly documented in endless UNDP Human Development Reports 
(UNDP, 2014). Furthermore, food insecurity is directly linked to poverty, since the well-
off rarely face hunger or the fear of hunger (Ziegler, 2013). Some academics argue that 
the lack of economic growth during this free market era has to do with a shift in priorities, 
which followed the empowerment of the private sector; 
“The shifting of market energy to the servicing of its own debts related in good 
part to the restructuring of corporate ownership rather than investment in new or 
developing areas. This may be one of the keys to understanding how little real 
growth there has been during the era of Globalization in spite of a market awash 
in money” (Saul, 2005, p.84). 
Additionally, Veltmeyer and Rushton argue that a major factor behind this shift was the 
fall of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, which meant that the capitalist development model 
did not need to compete with the socialist development model and so it abandoned its 






model (Veltmeyer & Rushton, 2013). Consequently the shift from state-led development 
to market-led development undermined the human development project that had been in 
place, as new free market policies reduced the role of the state in regulating the economic 
sector and its role in building and sustaining societal infrastructure, which had acted as 
the fundamental groundwork in protecting the wellbeing of populations and enhancing 
human welfare globally (Veltmeyer & Rushton, 2013).  Furthermore, the IMF’s 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that accompany IMF loans to nations, work to 
restructure societies to enable free market function; this includes creating free capital flow 
by deregulating markets, devaluing domestic currencies, dismantling social safety nets, as 
well as decentralization and privatization of publically owned resources (Harvey, 2005; 
McNally, 2006; Veltmeyer & Rushton, 2013).  As Jean Ziegler, the former United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food explains, 
“Today it is the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank that determine the economic 
relations that the dominant countries maintain with the peoples of the South. But 
in matters of agricultural policy, these organizations faithfully obey the diktat of 
private multinational corporations. This is why the FAO and the WFP, which were 
originally founded to combat extreme poverty and hunger, no longer play, in 
comparison to the corporations, anything but a vestigial role” (Ziegler, 2013, p. 
112). 
This is one reason why the current food system has been labelled the “corporate food 






agricultural sector is no longer structured and maintained by the state but by the private 
sector; similarly it no longer caters to population needs but to market demand (Ziegler, 
2013).  
In order to understand the rationale for the priorities leading the neoliberal free 
market agenda, it is helpful to consider the social and economic assumptions that drive 
this school of thought. Most academics refer to this market-led development model as 
neoliberalism, or as globalization (Harvey, 2005; Saul, 2005; McNally, 2006; Veltmeyer, 
2007). In general, neoclassical economics aim to reduce the role of the state in order to 
create free markets (Gamble, 2009).  Within neoclassical economic theory, the underlying 
economic assumption is that the market is autonomous and self-regulating, suggesting 
that state intervention in the function of the market is a hindrance that prevents the market 
from functioning at its full potential (Harvey, 2005; Gamble, 2009). However, the 
assumption ignores the fact that “markets are not neutral” (Murphy, 2008, p. 528).    
There are several key features of neoliberal economics; these include deregulation 
of the economic sector, privatization of state-run institutions and facilities, reduction in 
state function and the establishment of free markets (Hunt, 1989).  Similarly, privatization 
of state-run services or the public sector is done with the fabricated assurance that the 
private sector will improve the efficiency of how funds are managed (Gamble, 2009). 
Proponents of neoliberalism argue that the allocation of public assets to the private sector 
is the best way to ensure that society’s wealth will be properly invested (Hunt, 1989). 






“Countries at every level of per capita GDP performed worse during the neoliberal 
era than in the two preceding decades. The only exceptions to this trend were in a 
group of Asian newly industrializing countries (the World Bank’s “eight rapidly 
growing countries,” notably China but also India), whose governments continued 
to pursue an essentially interventionist approach, eschewing neoliberal policies in 
their path towards national development” (Veltmeyer, 2007, p. 24-25). 
Regardless of the evidence, the neoliberal development model continues to reduce the 
role of the state, ensuring that the state’s primary function is to establish the prerequisites 
required to sustain a free market economy, which is done through institutional 
legitimation of neoliberal values and ideologies where the rights of corporations and other 
private interests outweigh the rights of individuals or communities (Harvey, 2005).  
Critics of the market-led model argue against the neoliberal claim that state intervention 
is detrimental to economic development by referring to the historical processes through 
which the state has played a crucial role in economic development (Veltmeyer, 2007). As 
economist Paul Davidson (2009) contends, 
“The existing international trade and payment system permits, and actually can 
encourage, the spread of such depressionary forces globally. The 1944 Keynes 
Plan was deliberately designed to prevent the spread to other nations of a 
recession and failure of financial markets that might occur in any one nation. It is 
time to think about how we can reform the international payments system to 






Likewise, the implementation of such measures was quite visible in many industrializing 
countries prior to the advancement of neoliberal market-led development.  Additionally, 
Chang’s work reveals that since the initiation of development projects after World War II, 
state intervention has been proven to be necessary for the advancement of public 
wellbeing (Chang, 2004). Moreover removing the state from the management of basic 
need resource allocation, in the name of efficiency, is highly problematic if the intention 
of policy is to improve living conditions (Chang, 2004). Academics also point out that 
since the globalization of the neoliberal free market development agenda, societal issues 
such as unemployment, underemployment, poverty, hunger, illness, and ecological 
devastation have all increased (McNally, 2006; Veltmeyer, 2007; Gamble, 2009). As John 
Saul explains, 
“The most obvious failure of Globalization has been its incapacity to maintain 
employment. The entire global period has been one of high unemployment, with 
the numbers running ahead of population growth. In 1973 the OECD had 10 
million unemployed job seekers.6 By 1979 this was 18 million. Through the 
1980s the numbers ranged from 29 to 30 million. During the 1990s it was mainly 
in the mid-30s. Already in the new century it is rising towards 40 million … And 
this is happening even though employment statistical methods have been 







And in terms of food insecurity, the advancement of neoliberalism has seen global 
increase in export and import of food products in every country, which according to the 
food security framework ought to have reduced food insecurity greatly over the last thirty 
years since it increased food availability year round on the market (Bello, 2009b). 
However rising global poverty means that many people can no longer afford to buy the 
food that fills store shelves (Ziegler, 2013). Furthermore the restructuring of the 
agricultural sector to industrially produce export crops rather than staple food crops for 
local consumption has led to the loss of local sustainable agricultural food production 
capacity and the destruction of food producing communities, which has rendered all 
nations dependent on food imports (Bello, 2009b). This is illustrated by the fact that since 
the 1990s, regardless of the World Bank and IMF’s stance against poverty, global poverty 
has reached record levels (Veltmeyer, 2007; Ziegler, 2013), and the 21st century has been 
marked by the largest global recession since the Great Depression of 1929 (Bello, 2009a; 
Gamble, 2009), which has been accompanied by multiple global food crises (Ziegler, 
2013).   
Despite neoliberal arguments that these global hardships can be resolved through 
market-solutions, many academics argue that human development cannot occur without 
state intervention in market function,  through the re-introduction of market regulation 
(Davidson, 2009; Ziegler, 2013).  This approach was untaken during the Great 
Depression, for example with Franklin Roosevelt and John Maynard Keynes’s New Deal, 






abundant food supply. Measures such as job creation, heavy regulation of the banking and 
financial sectors, among others, also helped to alleviate the brunt of the Great Depression 
(Schlesinger, 1958). This approach was seen again after World War II with the 
advancement of Keynesian state-led development model to rebuild post-war Europe 
(Mee, 1984; Davidson, 2009).   
Despite the fact that the neoliberal argument has failed to produce much evidence 
to support its claims of improving living standards for the majority, the neoliberal 
globalization project has been in full force since the 1990s, particularly after the 
formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Madeley, 2002; Saul, 2005; Roberts, 
2008). As John Madeley (2002) explains, 
“While WTO rules permit developing countries to place some tariffs on 
agricultural imports, the structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and 
the IMF may prohibit them from doing so. A country’s WTO commitments 
cannot therefore be separated from obligations to other international bodies” 
(Madeley, 2002, p. 119). 
The inconsistencies between the conditionalities of the international economic institutions 
have grave implications for countries seeking assistance from them, as they are already in 
a compromised position economically; 
“The full WTO package includes three changes for the worse: deregulation (an 






example); privatization (sell-off of public lands, buying up patents of regional 
seeds, closing government warehouses that help small farmers, for example); and 
a distorted form of free trade (exports from government-subsidized farmers in 
Europe or North America to the Global South are allowed, but many unsubsidized 
Southern foods are  banned in Europe or America for safety reasons). Until the 
formation of the WTO, no international trade body intervened so extensively in 
the food and agriculture policies of any country, because food was considered a 
public security matter that all governments needed to plan for, and because food 
was so central to the income levels and food access of a huge majority of the 
world’s population” (Roberts, 2008, p.54). 
Development as a project requires social as well economic and institutional change 
(Veltmeyer, 2007).  Therefore it is important to examine the institutions and organizations 
that enable particular types of change, while preventing other forms from emerging. Paul 
Cammack (2003) makes the argument that the global development project, which is 
currently underway, is rather singular and that it is being pursued by particular 
international actors (Cammack, 2003). Additionally, Cammack explains that these 
international economic institutions are promoting a “global governance” (2003, p. 37) 
system of finance that upholds the interest of private groups, enabling them to 
monopolize international markets and establish a hegemonic order through which they 
can prescribe the economic aims and policies that countries are expected to follow and 






international institutions enforce the deregulation of markets, liberalization of capital 
flow, and privatization of publicly owned goods and services, while reducing the states’ 
functional capacities and regulatory powers (Cammack, 2003).; 
“The new economic model of structural reform was widely implanted in the 1980s 
and the 1990s with the promise of a new dawn – entry into the road to prosperity 
paved by foreign investment attracted by a market friendly approach towards 
national development. By the end of the 1990s, however, after three rounds and 
two decades of experiments with neoliberal policy reforms, the Promised Land 
was receding into the horizon. First, neoliberalism failed utterly to deliver on the 
promised economic growth. Harvard University economist Dani Rodrik (1997), 
no radical political economist, cites dismal growth performance during the 1990s 
as the most damaging evidence of the failure of neoliberalism. The facts are clear: 
two decades of neoliberalism failed to generate economic growth. Worldwide, an 
annually averaged per capita growth rate over the preceding period of state-led 
development and interventionism was reduced by half, from 3 to 1.5 percent in the 
industrialized countries …” (Veltmeyer, 2007, p. 24). 
Considering the lack of credibility that the neoliberal market-led development model has 
produced, it is not surprising that many development researchers argue that in practice 
these international actors are inhibiting sustainable human-based development (Saul, 
2005; McNally, 2006; Veltmeyer, 2007; Ziegler 2013). As food sovereignty scholar Eric 






“Infinitely unregulated markets would eventually destroy both society and the 
natural resources that the [food] regime depends on for profits” (Holt-Giménez, 
2013, p.2) 
Moreover, decades of research demonstrate that there is a causal relationship between the 
food crises that continue to unfold and the prevailing free market development agenda 
that has come to define and organize the international market structure.  
 
3.2.0 Causes of Food Crises and Food Insecurity 
The period preceding 2007 was marked by global crisis in the energy and 
financial sectors, as well as in global food insecurity.  Although national and international 
agencies have created programs to address the rising poverty and hunger through the food 
security framework, these initiatives have called for greater protection of corporate 
power, for expanding free markets and increasing privatization measures of agricultural 
lands and other natural resources, which have created the current corporate food regime 
and the rise in global hunger that has resulted (Holt-Giménez, 2009a). The ongoing global 
food crisis is the outcome of the interrelating factors, primarily the “economic volatility 
of the corporate food regime” (Holt-Giménez, 2009b, p.4), which Holt-Giménez contends 
began to accumulate in the 1980s with the advancement of neoliberal globalization that 
enabled corporations to monopolize the global food supply, which also intensified social 






As discussed in chapter one, research strongly indicates that the global food 
supply is plentiful (Poole-Kavana, 2006; Ziegler, 2013); even taking natural disasters into 
consideration, studies clearly establish that there is currently enough food to end global 
hunger. Having explained the myths about global hunger in chapter one, this section will 
look at the causes of the current food crisis and growing global food insecurity. 
 
3.2.1 Market Speculation   
One major factor behind the multiple global food and energy crises that have risen 
since 2007 is the deregulation of international commodity markets, which has allowed for 
greater speculation of food commodities (Altieri & Toledo, 2011).  Food commodities 
include staple crop foods, which make up about 75 percent of the world’s human diet 
(Ziegler, 2013), and which populations rely on for basic subsistence. Speculators include 
investment banks and hedge funds, among others (Ziegler, 2013).  
In 2008, speculation on food commodities, including staple crops, created an 
abrupt rise in food prices and drove about 150 million additional people into material 
devastation, setting record levels of global hunger, which led to protests in thirty-seven 
countries (Ziegler, 2013). This global food crisis overlapped with “record harvests and 
record profits for the world’s major agrifood corporations” (Holt-Giménez, 2009a, p. 
143). Even the World Bank acknowledged that the world’s food prices had risen by 83 






that the rise in food prices was rooted in the financial sector, the World Bank argued that 
it was a sign of global food shortages and proceeded to promote a new Green Revolution 
(Holt-Giménez, 2009a). 
 Regardless of the public outcry, in 2011 food speculators did this again, causing 
the sudden rise of already high food prices (Ziegler, 2013) and destroying the livelihoods 
and wellbeing of more than 2 billion people who were forced into poverty (UNDP, 2014).  
Ziegler argues that speculators do not differentiate between agricultural commodities and 
other commodities; speculators comprehend the possible outcomes of their actions but 
since their objective is to drive a quick profit, “They show no particular consideration for 
the consequences that their activity may have on millions of human beings as a result of 
increased prices” (Ziegler, 2013, p.213). Additionally, Ziegler explains that within a 
globalized international market structure, the actions taken by food commodity 
speculators impact all nations;  
“And if a billion people suffer from hunger, it is not because the world does not 
produce enough food, but because the powerful hold a monopoly on what the 
Earth provides. In this finite world of ours, in which there are no new places left to 
discover, nor any new lands left to conquer, the monopolizing of the Earth’s 
bounty takes on new meaning. It is an immense scandal. The lords of the agri-food 
markets and the agricultural commodities exchanges decide everyday who on this 







Similarly, food scholar Peter Rosset explains that speculators profit from the volatile food 
prices, both when the food price goes up and when it comes down; 
“…they bet like gamblers in a casino - gambling, in this case, with the food of 
ordinary people. These funds have already injected an additional 70 billion dollars 
of extra investment into commodities, inflating a price bubble that has pushed the 
cost of basic foodstuffs beyond the reach of the poor in country after country. And 
when the bubble inevitably bursts, it will wipe out millions of food producers 
throughout the world” (Rosset, 2008, p. 461). 
International organizations have taken notice of the vicious cycles of food commodity 
speculation, as the European Union has begun to put forth policies to regulate food 
commodity speculation (Neate, 2014).  Ziegler urges for state intervention to protect food 
agricultural products from market speculation; 
“… make the right to food a priority, to remove food from the realm of market 
speculation, to protect subsistence agriculture in the name of national heritage and 
invest in improving it worldwide” (Ziegler, 2013, p.247).  
This is also the stand that food sovereignty movement has taken, calling for agriculture to 









3.2.2 Food Prices  
Since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, agricultural sectors across the world 
have been reformed to fit into the free market design. This means that the agriculture 
sector has been transformed, as the World Bank and IMF, working with the WTO, 
impose new structural adjustment programs (SAPs) that require loan receiving 
governments to privatize public assets including agricultural marketing boards, as well as 
enterprises that oversee grain reserves (Rosset, 2008).  This enables the expansion of 
agriculture-based industries that are owned by private corporations; as a result 
corporations gain control of not only food production but food processing, packing, and 
distribution mechanisms as well (Roberts, 2008). As a recent report by Food First and La 
Via Campesina explains, this monopoly of agricultural production by a handful of 
Transnational corporations enables agricultural commodity chains, which control the 
agricultural market, set prices and dictate costs that reap profits from farmers as well as 
consumers. Consequently agriculture has become unviable for many farmers (Holt-
Giménez, 2008). The outcome has been the loss of national food sovereignty as nations 
are made vulnerable to the possible occurrence of crisis since they do not have sufficient, 
if any, food reserves to meet their population needs. Rosset explains that this dependency 
of nations on imported food to meet population needs has left them exposed to fluctuating 
food prices, which are set by the agri-business TNCs; this in turn has left populations 






Furthermore, under the neoliberal globalization model, all nations are impacted by 
the volatilities of food prices, which are set by a small number of corporations that now 
are the decision making body that determines the price of food products on the market 
(Rosset, 2008).   The lack of price controls on food commodities is the major cause of the 
rise of food prices globally (Ziegler, 2013); as research has established, the price has 
nothing to do with food scarcity. Furthermore, speculation of agricultural commodities is 
the leading cause behind the rise of food prices (Ziegler, 2013). 
 
3.2.3 Land grabbing  
Land grabbing refers to the process of transferring publically owned lands, 
particularly agricultural land where countless communities of small-scale farmers are 
situated, to private investors or private interest groups (Holt-Giménez, 2013); leads to the 
uprooting of food producing communities who then become displaced migrants 
(McNally, 2006). Land grabs require the commodification of land, which occurs with the 
creation free markets, through deregulation, and the creation of national laws that allow 
for communally-owned lands to be expropriated by private investors (McNally, 2006), 
“This is the “drilling down” of investment capital in which land grabs—whatever 
their form— are simply one part of a larger reconfiguration of rules, markets and 
landscapes. The “grab” is one link in a long chain of larger political and economic 






Territorial restructuring refers to the transfer of control from the public to the private 
entity, which then has control over the institutions, the rules and social relations that 
influence production. The ultimate goal of this process is “to extract wealth” (Holt-
Giménez, 2013, p.2) from the combines of land and labour (Holt-Giménez, 2013). 
Additionally commodity speculation, which includes food speculation as well as 
land speculation, is an integral part of the land grab phenomenon since market demand is 
believed to be one of the key forces driving land grabs (Holt-Giménez, 2008). Food First 
researchers explain that during the 2008 food crisis, TNCs began large-scale land grabs, 
seizing the opportunity to turn a profit from increased market demand for industrial crops 
and agrofuels (Holt-Giménez, 2008; Holt-Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Moreover, these 
land grabs were made possible through the expansion of free market initiatives through 
national policies, particularly through the privatization of public lands (Holt-Giménez, 
2013).   
As a consequence of land grabs, subsistence farmers, small-scale family-based 
food producers and entire communities are displaced, becoming landless peasants 
(McNally, 2006). This process destroys communities, creating mass migration of 
populations that had previously existed in established communities for generations; it 
creates massive unemployment, poverty and hunger (McNally, 2006).  Moreover, land 
grabbing is often done using legitimate free market mechanisms such as privatization of 
land, land deals,  real estate speculation, land allocation for the production of agrofuels 






(Holt-Giménez, 2013), and under neoliberal market-led development, states are not 
supposed to intervene with market mechanisms (Davidson, 2009). 
Furthermore, the World Bank and the FAO promote the acquisition of large 
agricultural lands by private interests for industrial agrofuel production as well as foreign-
owned food production, which they argue are investments that are expected to reduce 
poverty or build food security. However during 2007, when global food prices shot up, 
about 83 million hectares of land were grabbed by TNCs and other private interest 
groups, indicating that there is no evidence to suggest that these initiatives reduce poverty 
or build food security at all. On the contrary, the crises that followed 2007 raised 
questions about what happened to the communities that had  inhabited those lands after 
their communities, livelihoods and means for meeting basic needs were undermined 
(Holt-Giménez, 2013); 
“Land, while viewed by the market as a tradable commodity, is the social space 
where economic and community decisions are made. It is the place of 
neighborhood, culture and livelihoods. For indigenous peoples, it is their territory. 
It is home” (Holt-Giménez, 2013, p.1). 
Furthermore, Holt-Giménez contends that land grabs are justified with the fictitious 
argument that land grabs are driven by food, water, and fuel scarcities rooted in the rise of 
global population levels (Holt-Giménez, 2013). However as discussed in chapter one, 
researchers have discredited these claims; moreover this argument fails to address the 






“It does not explain how scarcity is produced through inequitable economic 
growth (leading to hunger during record harvests, for example), or who benefits 
from scarcity. Nor does this explain how land grabs actually happen, why they 
only happen to poor and marginalized communities, or why they are often 
facilitated by public institutions” (Holt-Giménez, 2013, p.2). 
Furthermore as numerous scholars have found, there is no evidence to support claims that 
these misappropriated lands are used in a manner that reduces crises or improves the 
human condition in any form (Holt-Giménez, 2013). 
 
3.2.4 Agrofuel Production 
         Agrofuel production, or biofuels as they are also called, is a leading factor behind 
land grabs (Holt-Giménez, 2013). Agrofuels are being marketed as an environmental 
solution for air pollution; it is argued that burning agrofuels rather than petroleum-based 
fuels is less harmful since it reduces the greenhouse gas effect; however this argument 
fails to take into account the industrial agricultural methods that are used to grow 
agrofuels, which also lead to vast environmental devastation (Bello, 2009b). 
         The use of agricultural lands for the production of agrofuels is another reason for 
increased global hunger. This is because land that would otherwise be used for food 
production is used to grow agrofuels for export (Rosset, 2008). Agrofuels, which are 






for cars, or are exported as cattle feed (Bello, 2009b). Furthermore, agrofuels are 
produced using concentrated industrial agricultural methods, which raise serious health 
and environmental concerns; these are discussed below along with the Green Revolution. 
 
3.2.5.0 Green Revolution   
Before discussing the details of the Green Revolution, it is important to take a 
moment to discuss the existence of food systems. Food systems are organized by national 
or, as a consequence of neoliberal globalization, international entities. As Holt-Giménez 
explains, food regimes are the structures that order food production, processing and 
distribution, 
“A food regime is a “rule-governed structure of production and consumption of 
food on a world scale.” The first global food regime spanned the late 1800s 
through the Great Depression and linked food imports from Southern and 
American colonies to European industrial expansion. The second food regime 
reversed the flow of food from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere to fuel 
Cold War industrialization in the Third World. Today’s corporate food regime is 
characterized by the monopoly market power and mega-profits of agrifood 
corporations, globalized meat production, and growing links between food and 






Since agricultural production is crucial to the development agendas of all societies, it 
follows that food regimes are built in accordance with the priorities of development 
models.  
The Green Revolution refers to the model of industrial agricultural production that 
was advanced from the 1960s until the 1980s; it led to temporary increases in crop yields. 
This method of agricultural production relies on large-scale agrarian reform which entails 
dispersing small-scale farming communities and reallocating agricultural lands to large-
scale industrialized agricultural production (Food First, 2009).  Additionally, the Green 
Revolution is rooted in the creation and utilization of agricultural biotechnology, 
including inputs such as chemical fertilizers, chemical pesticides and hybrid seeds that are 
all transformative to food production (Bello, 2009b; Holt-Giménez, 2009b). This 
technologically intensive method relies on its genetically engineered seeds to yield higher 
harvests. However, for various reasons this agricultural method has only increased global 
hunger (Poole-Kavana, 2006). For one thing, the biotechnology that is used in the Green 
Revolution has long term negative impacts; genetically engineered seeds require 
excessive chemical inputs which studies have found to cause extensive soil and water 
degradation. The outcome has been the destruction of agricultural lands that no longer 
produce food in countries, which have implemented this industrial agricultural method 
(Poole-Kavana, 2006). 
Additionally, even in the phase of production when yields are temporarily high, 






does not change the “concentrated distribution of economic power that determines who 
can buy the additional food” (Poole-Kavana, 2006, p.2). Consequently, countries that 
have experienced Green Revolutions, such as India, the Philippines and Mexico, have 
seen a rise in exports of the abundant food produced while the domestic inhabitants have 
been come to face severe hunger (Poole-Kavana, 2006).   
Regardless of these facts, proponents of the free market neoliberal development 
agenda, the World Bank in particular via the food security lens, argue for the 
advancement of agricultural biotechnology to produce more food in order to resolve the 
rising global hunger (Holt-Giménez, 2009a).  In regards to this paradox, Sophia Murphy’s 
work examines the role of the market in the organization of the agricultural sector, and by 
extension in the prevention or advancement of a secure and sustainable food production 
and consumption order, within the context of market-led development.  Murphy argues 
that access to food is the most basic fundamental human right and one that must be 
protected by governments, against free markets (Murphy, 2008). Murphy argues that the 
commodification of human needs, especially of food, is problematic since historically 
human societies have been built around the assumption that it is the collective intention 
and function to protect the social wellbeing of those who live within (Murphy, 2008). 
Moreover, many researchers argue that the hyper focus on economic factors to achieve 
societal wellbeing is unfounded (Saul, 2005), since quality of life cannot be achieved 
through economic efficiency and cost reduction, since this priority conflicts with the costs 






explains that free markets are characterized by shifting power relations, which are not 
accounted for by the assumptions that are set forth by neoclassical economists that 
suggest free markets establish “perfect information flows, no barriers to new entrants in 
the market, and the capacity to adjust supply smoothly and rapidly with changes in 
demand” (Murphy, 2008, p.528). Consequently the impracticality of such assumptions 
often lead to market failures where due to excessive deregulation, the market apparatus 
fails to produce the preferred or projected results, especially when it is applied to the task 
of homogenizing the global food supply (Murphy, 2008). 
 In regards to food production, Murphy explains that the internationalization of 
private property rights has significantly reduced the rights of food producers globally 
(Murphy, 2008). The outcome has been the commodification of the food supply and the 
devaluation of food producers, which has consequently impoverished food producers as 
“Globalization has also given multinational firms direct access to countries’ agriculture” 
(Murphy, 2008, p.530). Furthermore, globalization has “significantly strengthened the 
power of the private sector and reduced the public space available for debate on how best 
to manage food and agriculture systems” (Murphy, 2008, p.530).  The societal and 
environmental damages, i.e. destruction of small-scale food producing communities, the 
rise in unemployment, the rise in poverty and hunger, as well as in ecological devastation 
(Murphy, 2008),  that Green Revolutions create are not addressed by market mechanisms; 
“The food crisis is bad, but another Green Revolution will make things much 






recognized by the IAASTD as the best strategy for rebuilding agriculture, ending 
rural poverty and hunger, and establishing food security in the South. To be given 
a chance, however, this strategy requires a combination of strong political will and 
extensive on-the-ground agroecological practice to overcome opposition from the 
well-financed Green Revolution” (Holt-Giménez, 2009a, p.154) 
The United Nations 2008 IAASTD report is discussed later in this chapter. The following 
section offers a crucial illustration of how the use of Green Revolution biotechnology has 
harmful impacts on multiple aspects of society, and why the food security framing of 
food-as-commodity further aggravates societal problems. 
 
3.2.5.1 The Impacts of the Green Revolution, Argentina   
Argentina has long been viewed as the star-understudy of the IMF for 
implementing its neoliberal free-market development projects. Case in point was when 
Argentina's President agreed to sign on with Monsanto and Cargill to shift the country’s 
agricultural sector away from food production and to produce biofuel soya for export in 
the 1990s (Scholl & Arrizabalaga, 2005). It is noteworthy to mention that before this 
period, Argentina was known as Latin America’s bread basket for its contribution of 
surplus agricultural food products to neighboring countries, promoting a secure food 
supply in the region (Brown, 2010).  This changed however after Argentina implemented 






in return for short-term loans (Bienfeld, 1991). This scenario holds true for most, if not all 
countries that take this path (Bello, 2009b).  During this period, the agricultural sector 
was completely restructured to promote the production of export crops such as soya, 
wheat, maize and sunflower production (Tomei & Upham, 2009). Proponents of the 
neoliberal free market agenda have argued that this was done in response to the 
international market’s growing demand for biofuel and cattle feed; furthermore with 
access to Monsanto’s agricultural technologies it was not long before Argentina began 
experimenting with genetically modified soybean seeds, which were designed to produce 
greater product yield (Brown, 2010). These changes in agricultural output severely 
influenced Argentina’s food consumption patterns. National food security came under fire 
in the 1990s when Argentina’s agricultural sector was restructured to replace much of its 
staple crop, food-based agriculture with extensive cultivation of mono-crops for export.  
According to a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report, soya made up 
more than  fifty per cent of the grains that were produced in Argentina in 2008 (Tomei & 
Upham, 2009).  Consequently the production of rice, the nations’ most important staple 
food crop, had dropped by forty seven per cent by 2002 (Pechlaner & Otero, 2011). Not 
only did this agricultural shift create a food crisis for the nation, but this restructuring of 
the agricultural sector also displaced much of Argentina’s traditional food producers, and 
small-scale farmers in particular, in the process (Brown, 2010). Many academics argue 
that the adoption of soybean farming in Argentina has undermined Argentina’s food 






lacked the technology and capital to compete with industrial soy farmers, and by altering 
the agricultural sector’s focus from staple crop production for domestic consumption to 
cash crop production for export (Wald, Rosin & Hill, 2012).   
Such restructuring eventually took its toll and by 2002, Argentina’s 
unemployment rate had hit a new high of twenty-five percent (Buono, Alan, & Bell Lara, 
2007). Additionally, after the 2008 global recession and following food crisis, things only 
got worse. The government took some initiatives to regulate trade through the 
implementation tariffs and quotas on export crops, to better regulate agricultural trade and 
to strengthen local economies. Despite these state-initiatives however, the issue of food 
insecurity continued to be a problem since there is a need for land reform and agricultural 
production reform to enable farmers to produce food crops for domestic consumption, 
using sustainable methods, rather than industrial biotechnology used to produce cash 
crops for export (Scholl & Arrizabalaga, 2005).   
Although the establishment of tariffs and quotas impacted trade dynamics, without 
allocation of farmland to domestic food production, other issues arise, such as the 
domestic population turning to the consumption of biofuel crops for food. This has been 
the case in Argentina where high national food insecurity has led the Argentine diet to 
accommodate the flood of genetically modified soybeans, i.e. agrofuel crops, in domestic 
markets. As Ann Scholl and Facundo Arrizabalaga (2005) explain, 
“Never missing an opportunity to expand its profits, Monsanto subsidiary Cargill 






Association of Direct Seed Producers to promote soya as the solution to the 
malnutrition problem in the country. Their aim is to integrate the bean into the 
Argentine diet and change people’s eating habits to suit their business 
interests…The Soja Solidaria (Solidarity Soya) project is ruthlessly promoting 
GM soya as a viable alternative  to traditional forms of nutrition among the 
poorest communities, which is creating a nutritional apartheid” (Scholl & 
Arrizabalaga, 2005, p.1). 
This change in diet, replacing food crops with agrofuel crops, has been extensively noted 
by researchers. According to the  United States Department of Agriculture, since 2001 
Argentina’s population’s consumption of genetically modified soya has increased 
dramatically – from 325 metric tons to 1192 metric tons in 2013 (United States 
Department of Agriculture, 2013). This change in consumption patterns raises the issue of 
the safety of consuming genetically modified soya, knowing that it is produced for the 
purpose of biofuel and not human consumption. Scholl and Arrizabalaga elaborate,  
“Monsanto’s GM beans have been highly exposed to agrochemicals containing 
glyphosate. Glyphosate is soluble in water and in order to make it penetrate the 
plant, a surfactant is added. Glyphosate is therefore present in the very core of the 
soya bean. Washing the bean is not sufficient to prevent the consumption of 
glyphosate. Glyphosate can be harmful to the eyes, causes skin inflammations and 






This point clearly illustrates the issue of addressing food insecurity through market-based 
solutions via the food security framework discussed below. 
 
3.3 Food Security 
The food security framework was established by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) of the United Nations. Food security has been defined as  
“The availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs 
to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in 
production and prices. (United Nations 1975 cited in FAO 2003)” (As quoted by 
Patel, 2009, p. 664). 
This conceptualization is not all-inclusive; it fails to address how the method of food 
production impacts communities and the environment, the cultural appropriateness of 
foods to regions they are imported to, the right of populations to consume domestically 
produced foods, the right of small-scale farmers to their livelihoods as the advancement 
of corporate-run industrial agriculture displaces entire farming communities, among other 
issues such as the quality of food produced.  
As Argentina’s experience demonstrates, the food security framework does not 
address the human impact, the population health impact, or ecological impact of the 
edibles that are dumped into domestic food markets by agri-businesses (Bello, 2009b; 






of food as central to culture and wellbeing; this framework only focuses on the quantity 
of food stuff produced and consumed (Patel, 2012). Within this framework, the 
consumption of biofuel crops by local communities that lack economic access to food is 
not seen as a problem but as a solution to the issue of hunger (Rosset, 2008; Patel, 2012). 
 Furthermore, the food security framework fails to protect the world’s food 
producers, which are predominantly small-scale family farmers and peasant communities, 
while promoting industrial agri-business who are in the export business, and are not 
invested in food production for domestic consumption where demand is high but 
purchasing power is low (Rosset, 2008). These concerns are minimized within the food 
security framework but are indispensable within the food sovereignty argument. As 
discussed in the previous section, the food security position has been found to be 
problematic to achieving hunger alleviation since it has promoted market-solutions that 
have enabled the expansion of free market neoliberal policies, which have effectively 
destroyed the sustainable agricultural infrastructure of practically every nation in the 
Global South, in order to create markets for agri-business TNCs (Bello, 2009b; Rosset, 
2009a). 
 While the importation of food products have indeed increased availability year 
round for those who can afford them, the loss of local sustainable agricultural food 
production capacity has rendered nations dependent on foreign food imports, 
undermining the food security platform (Bello, 2009b). Furthermore, the quality of 






processed and preserved. There is also the concern that the import of food stuff has 
changed the dietary intake of local populations, as is demonstrated by the case of 
Argentina, which has been framed as an attack on the cultural identities of populations 
since food preparation and consumption patterns are based on cultural practices (Roberts, 
2008).  
The food security framework is relevant to this study only from the position that it 
has contributed to the aggravation of hunger and loss of national food sovereignty, 
resulting in under development. Interestingly, it is often proponents of the neoliberal 
market-led development model who falsely claim that the food security framework, 
which promotes the creation of free markets and the deregulation of sectors, will end 
hunger (Bello, 2009b).  These food security arguments contradict development studies 
that have documented the trends that have come to define the neoliberal globalization era; 
“…rising inequality is strongly linked to neoliberal policy reforms adopted in 
industrialized, transitional and developing countries alike” (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2003, 
p.6).  Furthermore as Gardiner and Halweil argue, 
“Today our food supply is nothing less than cornucopian, favoring the world with 
unprecedented quantities and varieties of food. Yet more people and a greater 
proportion of the world today are malnourished – hungry, deficient in vitamins or 
minerals …” (Gardner & Halweil, 2000, p.10). 
And regardless of all of the research showing that food crises are the outcome of free 






institutions still continue to argue that greater investment and research in biotechnology 
will provide global hunger solutions by finding new ways  to increase agricultural yields 
(Holt-Giménez, 2009a).  
 
3.4.0. Food Sovereignty  
The concept of food sovereignty grew as a global response to the large-scale 
devastation brought on by decades of free market food security initiatives that were 
imposed on people across the globe. As mentioned in chapter two, the United Nations 
2008 IAASTD report argues against the market-solution framework of food security and 
promotes the adoption of propositions made by proponents of food sovereignty,  “… 
adoption of locally appropriate and democratically controlled agroecological methods of 
production, relying on local expertise, local germplasm, and farmer-managed, local seed 
systems” (Holt-Giménez, 2009a, p. 148). This is important to highlight because there 
needs to be a distinction made between the food security and the food sovereignty 
positions, particularly since before this 2008 IAASTD, the United Nations supported the 
food security framework.  
The theoretical basis of food sovereignty was created as an alternative to the food 
security framework since the latter failed to address rising global hunger (Rosset, 2009a; 
Rosset, 2009b). And although food sovereignty is conceptually tied to food security, the 






while the food sovereignty framework identifies food as central to the human existence, 
and as such, as a human right (La Via Campesina, 2010), the food security framework 
identifies food as an essential commodity bound within the laws of the free market (Bello, 
2009b; Ziegler, 2013).  The discrepancy lies in the fact that the food security approach is 
rooted within the neoliberal framework, which propositions the market as the engine 
behind development, while food sovereignty rose as an alternative to the market-led 
development model (Patel, 2009). Additionally, proponents of food sovereignty contend 
that food security’s pro-corporate stance undermines its aim to end global hunger; 
“First, global corporations are structures designed to consolidate what they 
control. They automatically empty activities out of smaller or more isolated 
communities, unless there is some quite remarkable reason to stay. This presents a 
challenge for democratic systems, which cannot function if large parts of their 
nation-states are abandoned economically” (Saul, 2005, p.126-127). 
Contrary to the food security framework, the ideological origins of food sovereignty are 
rooted in the concerns voiced by small-scale producers, indigenous and peasant 
communities in Latin America; the food sovereignty movement argues that food is a basic 
human right and therefore must be de-commodified (La Via Campesina, 2010). 
Furthermore, advocates of food sovereignty argue against repeating the Green Revolution 
through the use of agro-chemicals and genetically modified seeds; they advocate a return 
to culturally rooted, local, environmentally sustainable methods of agricultural production 






agroecological food production for local and domestic consumption rather than industrial 
agricultural production for export (La Via Campesina, 2010). 
This focus on small-scale polyculture food production contrasts the industrial 
agricultural methods championed by the Green Revolution and the current food security 
framework. In order to achieve this goal of transforming industrial agricultural production 
to agroecological production, the Food Sovereignty paradigm requires that redistributive 
land reform be undertaken by the state; 
“Redistributive policy implies, above all, the expropriation of private lands that 
serve no social purpose. The goal should be to redistribute land and power, 
altering the relations of power in society in favour of farmers and the coalitions 
that support them. Such an agrarian reform cannot be carried out through market 
mechanisms … an agrarian reform that guarantees communal land ownership and 
that is designed to resist the threat of counter-agrarian reform ” (Torrez, 2011, 
p.51). 
This prerequisite for achieving food sovereignty, that is the conversion of land to 
agroecological food production, was undertaken by Cuba’s government during the special 
period, which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. By the time that the food 
sovereignty discourse reached the international arena, Cuba’s special period was already 
under way and before food sovereignty was fully conceptualized, Cuba’s national 






Arguing that the market-derived food security model was failing to address the 
root causes of hunger, to secure sustainable food production, to promote access to local 
and culturally applicable food, and to reduce global hunger in general, collectives of 
small-scale farmers, peasant farmers and various societal groups designed and put forth 
the food sovereignty framework, which various scholars and food advocates formulated 
into a paradigm (Rosset, 2009a; Rosset, 2009b). Access is a point of contention in the 
food sovereignty discourse (Rosset, 2008; Rosset, 2009c) not just access to food, land and 
non-genetically modified seeds, but also to water, community, and other publically owned 
resources that are increasingly becoming privatized and inaccessible for many (McNally, 
2006);  
“According, again, to WHO, one-third of the world’s population still has no 
access to safe drinking water at an affordable price, and half of the world’s 
population has no access to sanitation and sewage facilities” (Ziegler, 2013, 
p.182). 
Such trends of growing inequality are what proponents of food sovereignty aim to 
address; this is not really plausible through the market-led development model where only 
large economic actors, i.e. international economic institutions and transnational 
corporations, hold monopoly on decisions regarding all aspects of development including 
the agricultural sector (Aliteri, & Nicholls, 2008; Holt-Giménez, 2009b).  It is for this 
reason that the Food Sovereignty paradigm requires a state-led development model in 






societies and implement even-handed land reforms to protect sustainable food production 
methods and small-scale food producers (Polanyi, 2001; Poole-Kavana, 2006).  
Moreover, food sovereignty prioritizes each nation’s right to produce its own food 
supply and for nations to protect it autonomously from external volatilities, for the sake of 
national interest (Rosset, 2009a; Rosset, 2009b).  However since nations are 
predominantly integrated into the international free market and have incorporated free 
market policies within their agricultural sectors, including privatization of land schemes 
and the replacement of traditional small-scale agricultural communities with corporate-
owned industrial agriculture (Roberts, 2008), there is no known nation to achieve full 
food sovereignty in the twenty-first century. However, Peter Rosset (2009) explains that; 
“Under the Food Sovereignty paradigm, La Via Campesina and a growing number 
of progressive and semi-progressive governments, in Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and elsewhere, propose that we 
not only reregulate the food commodity markets that were deregulated under 
neoliberalism, but regulate them better than they were before, with genuine supply 
management, making it possible to set prices that are fair to farmers and 
consumers alike. That necessarily means a return to protecting the food production 
of nations, both against the dumping of artificially cheap food and the importation 
of artificially expensive food, which we face today. It means renationalizing and 






improved versions that actively include farmer organizations as owners and 
administrators of public reserves. That is a key first step” (Rosset, 2009c, p.20). 
Additionally, limiting or eliminating industrial food production and the production of 
mono-crops would allow for increased food production. Accordingly, an increase in the 
production of staple food crops for local consumption would help alleviate domestic food 
insecurity (Bello, 2009b). Moreover, development scholar Michel Pimbert (2009) agrees 
that in order for food sovereignty to be realized at the national level there needs to be 
congruence between grassroots efforts and state efforts to reform legislation and policies 
in favor of protecting national food producers and the nation’s food supply (Pimbert, 
2009).  Pimbert argues that there are several steps that governments can take to help 
establish food sovereignty, such as policies to “ re-introduce protective safeguards for 
domestic economies to guarantee stable prices that cover the cost of production, including 
quotas and other controls against imports of food and fibre that can be produced locally” 
(Pimbert, 2009, p.10). Furthermore, Rosset argues that in order for nations to regain food 
sovereignty within the global free market context, governments need to re-invest in 
restructuring the agricultural sector to promote and protect small-scale food producers, 
rather than support the expansion of agro-business oriented producers who mainly 









Agroecology refers to the utilization of ecological understanding to agricultural 
production (Koont, 2009). Agroecology is an ecologically sustainable method of food 
production that utilizes renewable resources, including the replacement of chemical 
fertilizers or pesticides with natural ones. Furthermore agroecology relies on the use of 
the natural environment where the food production site is situated and the application of 
the skills of local small-scale producers to pass on methods and knowledge (Altieri & 
Toledo, 2011). Proponents of agroecology oppose the use of Green Revolution 
biotechnology, such as chemical inputs and genetically modified organisms (GMO) in 
agriculture (Rosset, 2009b).   
Agroecology is an essential component of the Food Sovereignty paradigm (Altieri 
& Toledo, 2011; McMichael & Schneider, 2011; Torrez, 2011); it is sustainable, safe, 
culturally appropriate, and produces high quality products, while restoring the health of 
agricultural lands; 
“Agroecological initiatives aim at transforming industrial agriculture partly by 
transitioning the existing food systems away from fossil fuel-based production 
largely for agroexport crops and biofuels towards an alternative agricultural 
paradigm that encourages local/national food production by small and family 
farmers based on local innovation, resources and solar energy. This implies access 
of peasants to land, seeds, water, credit and local markets, partly through the 






opportunities and agroecological technologies” (Altieri & Toledo, 2011, p. 587-
588) . 
The advancement of this agricultural model requires state intervention in markets to 
protect the agricultural sector from privatization, to protect small-scale domestic food 
producers and facilitate their access to local markets and to invest in the necessary 
infrastructure that would enable them to meet domestic population and domestic market 
demands (Rosset, 2009b). In this sense the agricultural sector needs to be disconnected 
from the international markets to allow for the establishment of national food supplies 
and national food sovereignty.  
Agroecology requires the application of diverse knowledge of small-scale 
farmering communities to develop agro-ecosystems to work within the demands of 
production lands, to utilize natural remedies for obstacles to food production, rather than 
use chemical inputs; with the aim of restoring and reviving the land’s food production 
capacities (Altieri & Toledo, 2011). Additionally, through their research Altieri, Fune-
Monzote and Peterson (2012) have found that small-scale farming communities are more 
productive than large-scale industrial farms; 
“The inverse relationship between farm size and output can be attributed to the 
more efficient use of land, water, biodiversity and other agricultural resources by 
small farmers. So in terms of converting inputs into outputs, society would be 
better off with small-scale farmers. Building strong rural economies in the Global 






to remain with their families and will help to stem the tide of out-migration” 
(Altieri, Fune-Monzote, Peterson 2012, Pg.5). 
This cannot happen within the context of large-scale industrial agriculture on privatized 
lands and it cannot happen within a development agenda that prioritizes profits over 
human wellbeing, and by extension ecological wellbeing (Rosset, 2008; Rosset, 2009b). 
This does not mean that agroecology is unfeasible in free market societies, but that state 
intervention is required to reverse the privatization of agricultural lands and to set up 
protection mechanisms to safeguard national food production (Saul, 2005; Roberts, 2008; 
Rosset, 2008; Rosset, 2009a; Torrez, 2011).  
In the context of Cuba, the post-revolutionary agrarian reforms of 1959 and the 
early 1960s placed firm limits on the scale of private holdings. Furthermore, 
expropriation of large-scale private land titles under the pre-existing latifunda ended the 
potential for private land grabs. Insuring food sovereignty had already been rehearsed in 
1962 in response to the trade embargo that led to food shortages and the introduction of a 
new entitlement to food scheme, the food rationing scheme was introduced by the Cuban 
government. Through post-revolutionary agrarian reforms, the government acquired full 
autonomy to allocate land for agroecological production at the onset of the special period 
(Alponte-Garcia, 2009; Koont, 2009; Koont, 2011; Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, 
Lastra-Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011; Gürcan, 2014). Moreover, it is important to note 






(Murphy, 1999), making the transition from large-scale industrial agriculture to small-
scale food production more manageable via state support; 
“Given the economic, energy and climatic conditions facing the island, the Cuban 
peasantry supported by agroecological strategies exhibits today the highest 
indexes of productivity, sustainability and resiliency in the region. Agroecology, 
as being promoted by Campesino a Campesino movement, is proving to be the 
most efficient, cheap and stable way of producing food per unit of land, input and 
labor. As this process advances, more small farmers join this agroecological 
revolution (the government now is giving up to 13.5 hectares to families interested 
in becoming farmers: so far there are 100,000 petitions for this land), and the goal 
is to reach 1.5 million hectares under agroecological management, enough to 
make the island food sovereign (Funes, 2009; see also Rosset et al. 2011)” (Altieri 
& Toledo, 2011, p.601). 
As Altieri and Toledo explain, through state-supported land reforms Cuba’s agriculture 
moved away from large industrial state farms to small-scale agroecology-based food 
production schemes (Altieri & Toledo, 2011); through such state-initiatives Cuba was 
able to achieve a high level of food sovereignty. However, it is important to note that 
achieving food sovereignty is a long-term process and although Cuba did reduce its 
import of food stuff from 1993 – 1997 (Altieri & Fune-Monzote, 2012), it has yet to 






dietary needs exclusively through domestically produced foodstuff, without the need for 
imports.  
 
3.4.2. Urban Agriculture 
Urban Agriculture (UA) refers to the process of agroecological and organic production 
methods used within the urban context for the purpose of enhancing the local food 
supply, as was the case in Cuba (Gürcan, 2014). Efe Gürcan (2014) elaborates, 
“Broadly speaking, the practice of urban agriculture in Cuba was built on three 
basic principles: the use of environment friendly organic methods, the rational use 
of resources, and the direct marketing of produce to consumers (Companioni et 
al., 2002, p. 220)” (Gürcan, 2014:9). 
Cuba’s achievements in urban agriculture have seen the ultimate agricultural restructuring 
from industrial, export-oriented agriculture to organic and semi-organic agriculture 
(Gürcan, 2014). Gürcan explains, 
“Cuba has shown that it is possible to shift emphasis from global food to local 
agriculture in line with the needs of people, communities, and the environment 
(Gorelick, Merrifield, and Norberg-Hodge, 2002, p. 112). With policies built on a 
vast network of cooperation and interactions between domestic and transnational 






Additionally, Cuba’s urban agriculture has seen the use of public space, such as 
community gardens and old lots, as well as private spaces such as privately owned patios, 
transformed into community gardens. Other examples of urban agriculture include the 
operation of roof tops to grow food for family and community consumption. This is in 
addition to the food produced on state farms, or later on agricultural cooperatives in rural 
communities, as well as on state enterprises where food is produced to be consumed by 
the labour force (Koont, 2009; Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc, & 
Acosta-Valdésd, 2011; Altieri & Funes-Monzote, 2012). As various food sovereignty 
scholars have noted; 
“Cuba’s achievements in urban agriculture have also grown and are truly 
remarkable: 383,000 urban farmers farm more than 50,000 ha of otherwise unused 
land and producing around 4 million tons of vegetables (top urban farms reach a 
yearly yield of 20 kg/m2 of edible plant material using no synthetic chemicals) 
enough to supply 40–60% or more of all the fresh vegetables in cities such as 
Havana, Villa Clara, and others (Koont 2009)” (Altieri, Fune-Monzote, Peterson 
2012, Pg.7). 
This is significant because although urban agriculture initiatives are becoming more 
common globally, researchers argue that Cuba is the only country to be so highly 
successful in achieving and maintaining environmentally sustainable urban agriculture; it 
is the position of this study that Cuba’s success is in large part due to the state’s initiatives 






3.5 Background on Polanyian framework:  
In the previous chapter we developed an analytical framework for assessing the 
relationship between markets and societies using Karl Polanyi’s heuristic of fictitious 
commodities as well as his theory about the embedment of economy into society. This 
section will focus on applying a Polanyian framework to the modern history of Cuba, 
with the aim of assessing the forms of economic transformation that Cuba has undergone. 
This section provides the background for understanding the transformation of social 
relations in Cuba leading up to the special period, which have provided the basis for the 
advancement of food sovereignty in Cuba.  
As mentioned earlier, Polanyi’s political economy framework is designed to 
address the relationship between markets and society through the means by which the 
economy is incorporated, or ‘embedded’ into society. Since a given society is necessarily 
bounded territorially by the parameters of the nation-state, Polanyi’s framework would 
seem to be limited to the analysis of individual cultures or societies. However, Polanyi’s 
framework is able to bridge the chasm between the local, national economy and the 
global economy through the mediation of the state. In his analysis, not only does the state 
act to mediate the conflicting socioeconomic interests within the nation, but it also plays a 
role in the formation of regional economic blocs which constitute the political 
infrastructure of the global economy. Given this emphasis on the state as a principle agent 
of intervention between local economies and the global economy, Polanyi’s political 






mercantilist (Hettne, 2006).   This section will provide a theoretical overview of Polanyi’s 
political economy framework both at the national scale of economic organization of 
society, and at the international scale of mercantilism, followed by a historic overview of 
Cuba’s economic transformation under mercantilism.  
 
3.5.1 Economic Organization of Society 
 Polanyi’s political economy framework is centered on the question of how the 
economy is incorporated into society through institutions, and in turn, how the social 
relations of a society are organized to allow for the incorporation and operation of 
economic activity. As discussed earlier, societies in which the economy is securely 
embedded are the most stable, whereas the disembedding of the economy, and the 
emergence of a self-regulating market detached from pre-existing social relations, creates 
the most unstable configuration between the market and society (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 
2001).  
In order to better comprehend how economies are incorporated into societies 
through analytical categories, Polanyi relies on invariant modes of economic 
incorporation encountered across cultures, as documented through economic 
anthropological research.  Tanya Chavdarova (2006) has described these invariant forms 
of economic incorporation as “basic patterns of economic integration” (Chavdarova, 






exchange… It is these modes that are the major determinants of the specific forms of 
economic organization and their historical changes” (Chavdarova, 2006, p.146). With this 
in mind, a more concise overview of the nature of the three invariant modes of economic 
incorporation is needed.  
Anthropologist Marvin Harris (1989) provides an overview of the reciprocal and 
redistributive modes of economic activity. Harris recognizes the reciprocal mode of 
integration as the form of material exchange with the greatest social customs attached to it 
(Harris, 1989). In other words, it is not a simple form of instrumental economic exchange 
deduced from a priori rational calculation, but one in which, “people do not specify how 
much or exactly what they expect to get back or when they expect to get it. That would 
besmirch the quality of that transaction and make it similar to mere barter or to buying 
and selling” (Harris, 1989, p.345). In such a system of exchange where precise monetary 
value is indeterminate, costs and benefits are established under explicitly social or even 
‘immaterial’ conditions including communal principle, personal pride, etc. This is the 
essence of the gift economy where the social obligations that accompany economic 
exchange over-determine any personal monetary incentives that are characteristic of the 
market form of exchange. Societies where the reciprocal mode of economic integration is 
dominant have been relatively rare (Harris, 1989). This may be due to the nature of 
reciprocal exchange, which requires close communal bonds, social relations that tend to 
recede with the rise of complex industrial societies (Polanyi, 2001). Yet these reciprocal 






such as social gift exchange or volunteer-based community activities (Harris, 1989). This 
realm of the social economy is distinct from rational market exchange, and we can get an 
intuitive sense of this difference if we recall how in many cultures receiving money as a 
substitute for a gift is considered vulgar because it inappropriately blends the impersonal 
realm of market values with the personal realm of social norms (Harris, 1989; Polanyi, 
2001). Based on the distinction between the social economy and the market, we would 
expect that societies in which the reciprocal mode is dominant would also be ones where 
the market economy is the most limited. 
As discussed however, the likelihood of encountering a modern industrial society 
that is rooted in the reciprocal mode of integration is highly improbable, since as 
populations grow along the widening division of labour, the allocation of wealth and 
resources across the various strata of society, as well as across the different sectors of the 
economy, become too alienated to sustain the intimate social bonds that are required to 
maintain the reciprocal mode as the dominant mode of economic integration (Harris, 
1989). The development of the modern state has played a mediating role in the 
organization of social relations and the growing complexity of industrializing economies. 
As such, states are responsible for overseeing the smooth flow of capital investments 
across the different sectors of modern economies, as well as for redistributing a portion of 
the national wealth back into communities to ensure the social reproduction of societies 






In regards to free market societies where the market-exchange mode of economic 
integration is the dominant mode of economic integration, states manage a unique set of 
relations between the self-regulating market on the one hand, and civil society on the 
other (Veltmeyer, 2007). Within this mode of integration, the allocation of capital 
resources and investments is determined through the mechanism of market prices set 
through the laws of supply and demand (Polanyi, 2001; Veltmeyer, 2007; Davidson, 
2009). The uniqueness of this mode of integration is that since prices follow the logic of 
exchange-value, which further expands and interlinks markets across a variety of 
commodities (as well as fictitious commodities), the allocation of resources directed by 
the market does not necessarily reflect the actual need for making use of these circulating 
commodities by consumers (Polanyi, 2001; Chavdarova, 2006). That is, the market 
exchange mode does not reflect the actual use-value of commodities, and through its self-
expansion the market runs the risk of disembedding from society with catastrophic 
consequences by not responding to the actual population needs for resource allocation 
(Polanyi, 2001).   
For Polanyi, the rise of market societies in the late 19th century was unprecedented 
because for the first time in human history, the creation and growth of the self-regulating 
market allowed the economy to separate from society; this led to a disconnect between 
the market interest and societal interest, as the exchange value in market transactions 






Although as we have seen, the reciprocal and redistributive modes constitute 
entirely different modes of economic integration and reflect the economic organization of 
societies that are vastly different, the firm entrenchment of the economy into social or 
political relations within these societies makes them distinct from market societies where 
the self-regulating market is given the power to re-configure societal relations rather than 
the other way around (Polanyi, 2001). On a global scale, the market mode of economic 
integration has become hegemonic, particularly following the expansion of neoliberal 
globalization. As we have seen, the central goal of the food sovereignty movement, as 
well as its overall raison d'etre, is to amend the misdirection that the global food regime 
has taken with the intensification of market logic in regards to food and agricultural 
production (Altieri & Toledo, 2011; McMichael & Schneider, 2011).  
The three modes of economic integration, reciprocity, redistributive, and market-
exchange, constitute Polanyi’s invariant economic categories across cultures (Polanyi, 
2001; Chavdradova, 2006). While in any given society one mode will be predominant, all 
three modes of economic integration can potentially exist across different levels of 
society. Chavdradova’s observation provides a succinct summary of the characteristics 
and interrelations of these modes of incorporation:  
“The social economy, as linked to reciprocity, is dominated by the principle of 
adequate response and has validity within community structures: family, 
neighbourhoods, relatives, friends and colleagues. The command economy 






application of political criteria to economic activities which results in the parallel 
existence of forcibly created formal structures and informal institutions. The 
market economy is the background for the flourishing of formal organizations, 
individuals and free associations. All these types of economy have their place and 
could be found in each society. The socio-economic specifics come from the way 
they are combined and relate to each other in a particular historical period.” 
(Chavdradova, 2006, p.146) 
This summary indicates that in industrializing societies, the three modes of economic 
integration co-exist in various degrees, from family and communal networks in which 
reciprocity is practiced, to the demands of the global market at a much broader scale of 
society. Furthermore, as Chavdradova highlights, the relative dominance of one particular 
mode over other existing modes of economic integration comes to define a specific epoch 
in a society’s history (Chavdradova, 2006).  
The three modes of integration presented by Chavdradova provide an analytical 
framework for characterizing the relationship between economies and societies across 
cultures. Unlike the market mode of market integration, with its links to the global market 
economy making it a macro-level occurrence, the scope of the reciprocal and 
redistributive modes of integration are limited to the micro-level of the national economy. 
More specifically, the reciprocal and redistributive modes of integration articulate the role 
of the economy in relation to predominant cultural practices and the degree of state 






redistributive modes of integration interact at the global scale needs further articulation 
since unlike the market mode of integration, the reciprocal and redistributive modes do 
not directly link to the global economy. In the case of the latter, such non-market global 
linkages are achieved through trade regimes.  
On that note, the following section articulates Cuba’s economic system both at the 
domestic level, in terms of its mode of economic integration, and at a global level, in 
terms of its trade regime. This requires the operationalization of the normative term 
“socialism”, which has characterized the central planning of Cuba’s national economy 
under the COMECON trade regime, into the two analytical categories presented above; 
the mode of economic integration and the characteristic trade regime.  
 
3.5.3 Trade Regime 
As previously discussed, from the three modes of economic incorporation, 
market-exchange is the only mode of integration that directly extends from the domestic 
societal context to the broader scale of the global economy (Polanyi, 2001). This is not 
surprising since according to Polanyi, the growth of a self-regulating market, whether in 
the development of a local labour market or a global stock market, bypasses state 
mediation and control in ways that other forms of economic integration, such as 
communal reciprocal exchange or state-redistributive allocation schemes, cannot achieve 






exchange however, encourages its expansion and interlinking on ever larger scales, 
making the market mode of economic integration the only one capable of dis-embedding 
from society (Polanyi, 2001).  To see how ‘socialist’ societies, as characterized by the 
redistributive mode of economic integration under central planning (Chavdradova, 2006), 
are integrated into the global economy, we need to look at their trade regimes. Table 4 
presents the three modes of economic integration that characterize a given national 
economy in parallel with its mode of integration into the global economy through a trade 
regime.   


















(i.e. Free trade) 
Mercantilist 




(i.e. Kula trade) 
 
Moving from the national scale of economic integration towards integration into 
the global economy through a trade regime we see that through trade, market-exchange is 
an extension of the market-exchange mode of integration of the national economy. For 
example, the Kula ring trade among Trobriand islanders of Western Melanesia, which 
Polanyi documents in his work, follows a unique non-market trade regime that also 
extends beyond the domestic scale and into a regional scale - without market institutions. 






tribes on distant islands, based on the trade of foodstuff and highly prized Kula rings. 
What makes this trade regime unique is that each tribal member has a counterpart on a 
distant island to which such exchanges are made ‘symmetrically’, i.e. without profit or 
surplus gain, mirroring the reciprocal patterns of exchange that take place within one’s 
own tribe at home (Polanyi, 2001, p. 51-52). This is foreseeable since the underlying 
logic of the trade regime is to preserve inter-tribal bonds rather than to exact a trade 
surplus.   
Of particular interest for our case study of Cuba’s socioeconomic transition during 
the special period is the redistributive mode of economic integration on the national scale, 
along with its integration into the COMECON trade regime on a global scale, which 
characterized the elements of most socialist nations prior to the onset of the special 
period. Having examined how central planning corresponds to the redistributive mode of 
economic incorporation under Chavdarova’s take on Polanyi’s framework, the next 
section will expand on the details of Cuba’s  system of agricultural production and 
mercantilist trade prior to the collapse of COMECON.  
 
3.6 Cuban Agriculture under Mercantilism  
Following the revolution of 1959, Cuba embarked on ambitious agrarian reforms 
to dismantle the Latifundio system of oligarchical agriculture that it had inherited from 






closer political ties that Cuba established with the USSR, Cuba formally joined the 
Eastern bloc trading regime COMECON in 1972, and restructured its economy to 
embrace the industrialization of its agricultural sector. This strategy was in accordance 
with Cuba’s agricultural history and its vast potential for producing export-oriented 
mono-crops such as coffee, citrus fruits, and cane sugar in particular which supplemented 
Cuba’s pre-established sugar refining capacities (Aponte-Garcia, 2009).  
Embarking on such a strategy of industrial agricultural production, as a member in 
the COMECON trading bloc, required Cuba to organize its system of production and its 
labour force under the highly centralized bureaucratic model that the other COMECON 
states had conformed to (Koont, 2011; Palma, Tora, Vázquez, Fuentes, & Hernández, 
2013). Cuba’s adoption of this model of development transformed it into a centralized 
redistributive state in terms of the national scale of the mode of economic integration. 
This was deemed necessary to meet its economic obligations under the COMECON 
trading regime based on export-import quotas in exchange for investments; this made the 
COMECON highly interdependent. Under this trading regime for instance, Cuba had to 
subspecialize its agricultural sector for the production of mono-crops rather than diversify 
this sector for domestic food production. This made the country highly dependent on 
COMECON-based trade not only to import vast quantities of fuel, chemical fertilizer, and 
pesticides necessary for industrial agricultural production, but it also made Cuba highly 
dependent on the importation of foodstuff to feed its population (Koont, 2011;  Palma, 






COMECON trading bloc exerted on the transformation of Cuba’s mode of economic 
integration at both the national and international scale, it is important to further analyze 
the COMECON trading bloc. 
As discussed above, the COMECON trading regime was not based on free trade. 
In fact, the terms of trade were politically negotiated under bilateral terms and most of the 
trade itself consisted of trade in commodities, with the central COMECON bank 
overseeing currency-based trade for investment purposes (Aponte-Garcia, 2009).  Björn 
Hettne (2006) provides a description of contemporary forms of mercantilism in 
international relations and trade; 
“Mercantilism is the ideological expression of the nation-state logic, operating in 
the economic arena and violating the liberal principle that free trade in the long 
run is for the benefit of all. Neomercantilism retains a similar suspicion of free 
trade, but transcends the nation-state logic in arguing for a segmented world-
system consisting of largely self-sufficient blocs big enough to provide 
“domestic” markets”” (Hettne, 2006, p.62). 
From Hettne’s definition, it is apparent that mercantilism in its contemporary form, i.e. 
neo-mercantilism, consists of a trading bloc which limits the market function within the 
boundaries of the bloc. While the COMECON nations went beyond this definition to 
include limiting the transfer of currencies within the COMECON trade regime, the 
COMECON trading regime still fits better within Hettne’s description of mercantilism as 






Cuba’s mode of economic incorporation at an international level, prior to the 1990 -1996 






















Empirical Study of Cuban Urban Agriculture 
 
4.1.0 Fictitious Commodity: Land-Nature 
This section will examine how land utilization underwent a tremendous 
transformation in Cuba during the special period in terms of land access, property 
relations, and how these changes shaped urban agriculture. Such an analysis will allow 
for an assessment of how land use fits within the study’s commodification scale. This 
section will also assess the status of nature, in the form of natural resource utilization and 
management, during the special period when Cuba underwent a shift from large-scale 
industrial agricultural production to small-scale agroecological food production. The aim 
of this section is to arrive at an assessment of the status of land- nature as fictitious 
commodities in the context of Cuba during the special period.  Moreover, this chapter will 
also examine to what degree Cuba fulfilled the Food Sovereignty paradigm’s Six Pillars 
criteria for achieving national food sovereignty.  
 
4.1.1 Land reform 
As discussed in earlier chapters, when Cuba entered the special period it faced a 
crisis in agricultural production and food provisions due to  its agricultural sector’s  






production, chemical fertilizers and pesticides (Aponte-Garcia, 2009; Febles-Gonzáleza, 
Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011). Furthermore, Cuba’s 
specialization in mono-crop production, namely in sugar, coffee, and citrus fruits, had 
created food insecurity that left the country dependent on food imports to meet the 
population’s dietary needs (Altieri &Toledo, 2011).  The state’s response to the emerging 
food crises in 1990, the early phase of the special period, was too focused on maintaining 
rural agricultural production by substituting labour-power and animal traction for tractors 
and other mechanized systems that required high inputs of petroleum, which Cuba lacked 
(Koont, 2009).  
At this early stage, the urban agriculture movement had not yet been established in 
urban centers to meet the food rations set for urban dwellers, and so agricultural 
production in rural areas were redirected from mono-crop production to emergency food 
production for domestic consumption (Koont, 2011). For this purpose, volunteer brigades 
were established to mobilize an urban labour force into rural areas (Deere, 1992). This 
early emphasis on diverted rural production was counter to the urban agriculture 
principle, but it was a necessary provisional solution until social infrastructure could be 
constructed through which to reallocate resources to urban centers to enable urban 
agriculture as a more sustainable solution to the crises. This is highly significant because 
before the special period, as a part of Cuba’s economic growth driven modernist 






of rural communities to urban centres had marked Cuban development. Consequently, by 
the 1990s, about 95 percent of Cuba’s population lived in urban centres (Koont, 2011).   
What was needed was a new set of economic and agrarian policies that would 
allow Cuba to overcome the deficiencies it had inherited from the system of industrial 
agricultural production, since it could no longer allocate scarce resources to maintain it.  
Consequently, the Cuban government passed the comprehensive Decree Law Number 
142 in 1993; this effectively dissolved the major state farms, particularly ones that had 
been geared towards sugar production to fulfill COMECON quotas, and established 
agricultural cooperatives or Unidades Basicas de Produccion Cooperativa (UBPC) with 
the aim of regionalizing production decisions to members of cooperatives in order to 
fulfill local food needs (Koont, 2011). The assets of the state farms were redistributed as 
credit for co-operative members, and idle public rural spaces were redistributed as 
usufruct for those wishing to engage in small-scale agriculture (Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-
Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011, p.727).  
 
4.1.2. Land metrics and distribution 
The comprehensive agrarian reform law of 1993 effectively amounted to a 
decentralized redistribution of land and property titles, since due to limited resources the 
state sectors could no longer fulfill such redistributive functions as maintaining food 






significantly grown in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). And while 
the redistribution of land following the 1993 decree did provide increased free access to 
public lands, the title of ownership, with exception of private home gardens remained 
under the jurisdiction of the state, substantially restricting any real privatization of public 
spaces (Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc., & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011; 
Koont, 2011). Under the 1993 agrarian reforms, the agricultural sector as a whole 
devolved from the pre-existing system of centrally planned industrial agricultural 
production, whilst urban agriculture took off as a parallel food production and self-
provisioning initiative in urban centers. Cooperatives played a crucial role in this process 
of transition, both in the restructuring of the agricultural sector – with the consolidation of 
the Unidad Básica de Producción Cooperativa (UBPC) cooperative units and 
Cooperativa de Créditos y Servicios (CCSs) - as well as in the expansion of Cooperativa 
de Producción Agropecuaria (CPAs) in urban communities in parallel with the more 
individualized means of urban agricultural production through private patios and parcelas 
utilization (Koont, 2011). 
The categories of land usage by urban agriculturalists, as listed in terms of scale 
can be classified as follows: patios (home gardens), parcelas (usufruct spaces), CCS 
(individual credit cooperatives) and CPA (collective cooperatives), along with the 
creation of more large-scale cooperative units in the form of UBPCs which are collective 
co-operatives in the agricultural sector (Koont, 2011, p.33).  Whereas the small-scale 






neglected,  the agrarian reform of 1993 allowed for the devolution of the state farms 
under the command of ministry of agriculture (MINAG) and ministry of sugar (MINAZ) 
into UBPCs, large-scale cooperative units within the agricultural sector (Koont 2011, 
p.19).  It is argued then that the redistribution of land in urban spaces was multi-scalar, 
which suggests a plurality of social relations ranging from the individual to group 
initiatives.  The metrics of smaller –scale land use for urban agriculture generally fell 
below 1000 m2 for patios and parcelas (Premat, 2005). A breakdown of the metrics of 
small-scale urban agricultural production in Havana is presented in Table 5: 
Table 5. Main food-oriented urban agricultural sites in Havana 
Production sites Land tenure Area 
Occupied 
Commercialization 
as main objective 
Year of 
creation 




























Patios (m2) Private >1000 No NA 
 
Note: Reproduced from Table 6.1; Premat 2005, p. 155. 
Table 5 is not exhaustive, it provides a general overview of some of the metrics and urban 
land tenancy schemes that were prevalent in Havana, without the inclusion of cooperative 
schemes such as CCS and CPAs. We can see from Table 5 that the scale of private patios 
fall well below 1000m2 while popular organiponics function on a much more expanded 
scale, ranging from 2000-5000m2 . It also should be noted that commercialization motive 
listed in the table refers to exchange within local markets (Premat, 2005).  
 
4.1.3. The social production of communal space 
In addition to the vitally urgent function that urban agriculture fulfilled for 
securing local food provisions during the special period, the space of urban gardens 
fulfilled additional, often unexpected, social functions as well. The first steps taken by 
individuals and communities to make urban agriculture viable were to clean up the urban 
usufruct spaces that became available through the redistribution of public spaces. This 
was a challenge because many such spaces had previously been used for waste disposal 
(Premat, 2009). However, communal efforts had tremendous effects in transforming the 






period when the function of providing local food provisions had become largely 
consolidated and stabilized through the state’s allocation of resources towards urban 
agricultural extensions and inputs, urban gardens became more about social space where 
the elderly could volunteer at leisure and children had school visits as a part of their civic 
education (Premat, 2009).  
 
4.1.4. Assessment of the fictitious commodity: land 
The land reform policies inscribed into the 1993 decree transformed property 
relations and the usage of public lands. The decree made land much more accessible to 
citizens, and the decentralization of urban agricultural production meant further socialized 
the usage of land, whether on an individual basis in patios and parcelas or on a more 
collective basis through cooperatives. Continued state retention of formal ownership of 
these decentralized redistributive lands prevented the privatization of such public spaces 
(Premat, 2003; Koont, 2011).  
The 1993 agrarian reform initiated two trends which, in our scale of 
commodification are a blend between semi-commodification and full socialization. On 
the one hand, the decentralization of land and its extension to the citizenry for the 
purposes of food production at the onset of the special period, places the status of land 
use within our commodification scale at approximate the fully de-commodified ideal-






semi-commodified/ semi-collective type or organization that is characteristic of the 
redistributive ideal-type.  The reason why the redistributive mode of economic 
incorporation is not fully collectivized is because of the highly rationalized social 
relations that it encompasses through bureaucracy and centralization (Chavdradova, 
2006). In order to overcome this impasse in our assessment of the status of land, we must 
extend our analysis of the social-human relations entailed by the distribution and 
functional use of land to the social-ecological relations entailed by the manner in which 
land and the resources it encompasses are utilized.  
As discussed earlier, the status of land as fictitious commodity falls between a 
hybrid range between the semi-collective type of organization and the fully universalized 
type within our analytical framework. In order to assess the status of nature, otherwise 
characterized by the utilization and management of natural resources in agricultural 
practices, as a fictitious commodity it is necessary to delve further into the theoretical 
relationship between society and the natural world. This is necessary because 
conventional economic analysis tends to treat the exploitation of nature in abstraction; as 
an inexhaustible source of resources. The Food Sovereignty paradigm however takes into 
account the environmental costs associated with industrial agricultural practices (La Via 
Campesina, 2010), thereby reconfiguring the notions of productivity, efficiency, and 
sustainability in terms of the ‘marginal’ costs that need to be factored in. Moreover, the 
impacts of human exploitation of nature are not immediately realized as ‘social’, (Poole-






4.1.5. Agroecological practices adopted during the special period 
It has become a truism that the adoption of agroecological practices were 
compulsory for Cuba as a result of calamitous circumstance; the economic shock and 
resource scarcity following the collapse of COMECON necessitated such a strategy. 
However, Cuba rose up to the challenge and gradually introduced many innovations in 
agroecological practices (Koont, 2009; Koont, 2011).  One of the key innovations which 
may have saved Cuba from devastation (Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-
Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011) was the creation of Centros de Reproducción de 
Entomófagos y Entomopatógenos (CREE), which are world leading centers for biological 
pest control that have been characterized as “the base of the national biological control 
program and are considered a true revolution in semi-industrial production of 
biopesticides and entomophagus for the control of agricultural pests (Febles-Gonzáleza, 
Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011, p.729). Other agroecological 
innovations include expanded bio-diversification through the decentralization of national 
seed banks into municipal branches that enabled greater access to biodiverse seed 
selection inputs for urban agriculturalists (Koont, 2011).  
With the shortage of chemical fertilizer imports, it became crucial for Cuba to 
switch to the utilization of alternative natural fertilizers.  These included minerals such as 
zeolites and dolomites and the cultivation of permaculture and sugarcane bio-products. 
Consequently, there are173 permaculture production centers in Cuba with the potential to 






Lastra-Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011), and green manure from a variety of 
herbivorous animal sources (Fusco, 2008; Febles-Gonzáleza, Tolón-Becerrab, Lastra-
Bravoc, & Acosta-Valdésd, 2011). During the early phase of the special period, the 
scarcity of oil also forced Cubans to switch to animal-based traction in the countryside to 
make up for the loss of mechanized traction, a practice that significantly reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions (Koont, 2011). Additionally, the success of the agroecological 
transformation of food production in Cuba has rendered it a world leader in sustainable 
development studies, particularly in terms of ecologically and culturally sound food 
production, which has been noted by various researchers, “Sustainable agriculture, 
organic farming, urban gardens, smaller farms, animal traction and biological pest control 
all became part of the new Cuban agriculture” (Altieri & Toledo, 2011, p.600). 
 
4.1.6. Assessment of fictitious commodity: nature 
As demonstrated by the description of Cuba’s agroecological practices adopted 
during the special period and the positive impact that such practices exerted on the 
environment in terms of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, the recycling of bio-matter, 
promoting ecological recovery and  improving the means of agricultural productivity 
without excessive inputs, the transformation of Cuban urban agriculture to agroecological 
practices promoted the advancement of long-term human development, which is in 
accordance with four of the Six Pillars of  the Food Sovereignty paradigm. Food 






endorsed during the special period have led Cuba to become a world leader in sustainable 
agricultural production and have validated and advanced the science of agroecology and 
global agroecological food production efforts. This is because in order for food 
sovereignty to be realized, there is a strong need for the state to support the food 
sovereignty agenda, as well as for consensus among food producers and consumers 
(Altieri & Toledo, 2011); 
 
4.1.7. Conclusion 
In the Cuban context, the status of land-nature fell between the semi-collective 
and fully universalized organization types, as outlined in chapter two, due to a 
combination of factors such as decentralization and increased accessibility of land that 
contrasted the formal ownership of the land by the state. This assessment was extended to 
the status of natural resource management within the context of Cuba’s adaptation of 
agroecological practices.  
Additionally within this framework, four of the Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty 
fall under Polanyi’s fictitious commodity of land-nature. Research collected about Cuba’s 
agrarian reforms and the state campaign for reallocating land extensively for food 
production for domestic consumption then fulfills the following pillars of food 
sovereignty:  Focus on Food for People (food production for human consumption) and 






utilization of organic urban agriculture food production schemes, along with the all-
encompassing agroecological food production methods also fulfill the food sovereignty 
pillar: Work with Nature (food production through methods that are ecologically sound). 
As Altieri and Toledo (2011) explain; 
“The growth of the agroecological movement can be partly linked to the training, 
extension and research activities of the Asociacion Cubana de Tecnicos Agricolas 
y Forestales (ACTAF) in its goals to promote agroecology throughout the island. 
But what constitutes the soul of the Cuban agroecological revolution are the 
efforts of about 100,000 families – almost half the population of independent 
small farmers in Cuba – who are members of ANAP (National Association of 
Small Farmers). These peasants practice agroecological diversification methods 
on their farms, thereby producing much more food per hectare than any 
commercial, industrial agriculture farm. These family farmers, many of whom are 
part of the Campesino a Campesino (farmer-to-farmer) movement, produce over 
65 percent of the country’s food, on only 25 percent of the land (Rosset et al. 
2011). The recent study of Machin-Sosa et al. 2010 revealed that in less than a 
decade the active participation of small farmers in the process of technological 
innovation and dissemination through farmer-to farmer models that focus on 
sharing experiences, strengthening local research and problem-solving capacities 






From this description, it can be concluded that creation of farmer organizations such as 
Campesino a Campesino, which put food production decision-making rights in the hands 
of farmers and promoted the expansion of small-scale, ecologically sound food 
production methods – fulfills a fourth and fifth of the Six Pillar of Food Sovereignty: Put 
Control Locally and Build Knowledge and Skills (refer to Table 2, Chapter 2). 
 
4.2.0 Fictitious Commodity: Labour 
As noted in earlier chapters, Polanyi characterized labour within broad societal 
terms rather than merely as a category of class or only within the narrow economic 
function as a generator of profit through employment. For Polanyi, the social character of 
labour, including the cultural and subjective needs that it fulfills both for individuals as 
well as for a given society, is just as significant as the economic purpose that it serves 
(Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001).  This section examines the fictitious commodity of labour 
within the Cuban context in order to assess the degree to which labour is socialized 
according to the Commodification/Socialization Scale for Fictitious Commodities. 
Following Polanyi's conception of labour then, labour is categorized according to 
analytical variables used by conventional economists, which includes variables such as 
employment and work incentive schemes, as well as normative variables that are not 
covered by conventional neoclassical economics, such as cultural practices, social 
cohesion and communal participation. The latter are based on our earlier 






which did not fit into the analytical framework of the Commodification /Socialization 
Scale for Fictitious Commodities. 
 
4.2.1. Analytical variables: 
Analytical variables refer to the conventional economic variables used to analyze 
employment trends, such as wages, labour productivity across various sectors, labour 
demographics, as well as more theoretical socio-psychological variables used for 
economic analysis, such as incentive schemes.  
 
4.2.2. Employment 
During the special period in Cuba, employment trends underwent a massive shift 
due to the transformation of broader macroeconomic relations between Cuba and the 
COMECON trading bloc, which propelled the urban agricultural movement that had been 
fairly marginal to Cuba's economy until the special period, to take a central role in the re-
organization of work and job creation (Cruz & Medina, 2003). With 155 000 people 
unemployed in the early phase of the special period, and a looming food crisis on the 
horizon as a result of projected decline of oil, fertilizer, and foodstuff imports from the 
COMECON nations, the Cuban state initiated a strategy to tackle the unemployment 
crisis and emerging food crisis by mobilizing the urban population to work in the country-






contingent employment consisted of volunteer work for a two year period, twelve hours a 
week, in which workers were provided with accommodations and access to agricultural 
produce and imported foodstuff (Deere, 1992). The payment component of this 
contingent labour scheme was based on a 100 peso delimiting mark. Those who 
previously earned more than 100 pesos retained their prior earning rate, while those who 
earned less than 100 pesos experienced a gradual increase in their salary during their two 
year term (Deere, 1992). The passage of agrarian and employment reforms in 1993, 
which legalized self-employment, contributed to the decentralization of the labour market 
in urban areas where food retailing jobs then began to complement the rise of urban 
agricultural production (Cruz & Medina, 2003).  
As the economic crises intensified with the rising scarcity of oil and imported 
foodstuff, urban agriculture emerged as a complementary solution to the crises by 
providing the necessary labour power in a labour -intensive field that is non-mechanized 
urban agriculture, in a time of high unemployment in urban areas. During this early 
period, alternatives to the wage form of remuneration were deployed to entice volunteer 
brigades with the promise of good food, accommodations and a vibrant cultural life 
engaged with civic duty (Deere, 1992).  
The demographic profile of the urban gardeners has varied highly. The great 
majority of urban gardeners were over thirty years of age; a significant proportion had 
experienced rural agricultural work at some point in their lives (Deere, 1992; Moskow, 






distinction in pay was not marked by the level of education or occupational experience 
(Premat, 1998). Gradually, through the state’s establishment of institutional support for 
urban agriculture, and civic committees connected with the Ministry of Agriculture, 
participation in urban agricultural production increased to include more voluntary and 
leisure forms of engagement, such as sustained school projects in urban agriculture for 
children, as well as the participation of the elderly as an alternative form of leisure 
socialization (Premat, 2009).  
The labour intensity of urban agriculture, particularly in the early phases of the 
special period when innovative agroecological techniques had not yet been introduced, 
involved the recruitment of a massive supply of local labour. The localism of hired labour 
was particularly important at the time because the petrol fuel crises limited both the 
migration of labour across excessive distances, and the transportation of agricultural 
produce from the rural areas to the urban centres – an important factor which in itself 
necessitated the emergence of urban agriculture to sustain local food consumption 
(Koont, 2011).  
In addition to the job creation that resulted from the mobilization of contingent 
labour in the early phase of the special period, and the more established community 
agriculture that grew in urban centers later on, jobs were also created in the knowledge 
economy of agricultural research which propelled the necessary agroecological 
innovations to make urban agriculture both sustainable, and viable on an expanded scale.  






was achieved through farmer consultations, such as those of Campesino a Campesino 
networks (Altieri & Toledo, 2011), as well as through the establishment of scientific 
networks with global agricultural research associations and academic centres (Fusco, 
2008; Koont, 2011). In terms of the utilization of farmers' integral knowledge, Audrey 
Fusco explains that,  
“…the farmers did more than train each other; they assisted the government in 
research of agroecological techniques. Techniques passed down through farmers 
for generations helped solve many problems; for instance, the discovery that ants 
are a successful control for the sweet potato weevil was found through recovery of 
peasant knowledge” (Fusco, 2008, p.104).  
The influx of such solid, grounded knowledge and skill in agriculture instigated a 
permanent change in the academic curricula of Cuban agricultural studies, which saw a 
shift from the teaching of industrial agricultural techniques and practices to ones rooted in 
agroecology (Fusco, 2008).  
The socialization of labour during the special period is clearly demonstrated by 
two trends, the creation of new incentive for citizen engagement in the self-provisioning 
schemes of urban agriculture and by the expansion of worker cooperatives as socialized 
labour throughout the two phases of the special period. During the onset of the special 
period, marked by the acute food shortage prospects, the mixture of formal payment 
schemes along with informal volunteer-based incentives helped mobilize masses of thh 






food production (Deere, 1992; Koont, 2011), of which many of the working contingent 
units later returned to the urban centers to become a permanent pillar of urban agriculture 
(Koont, 2011) Furthermore, in parallel with the development of urban agriculture, many 
of the CPAs and CCSs further expanded during this period with the help of the state in 
providing technical as well as material assistance in the form of agricultural inputs 
(Koont, 2011). The agrarian reforms of 1993 further consolidated the prominence of 
cooperatives in the agricultural sector of the economy through the creation of more large-
scale cooperative units in the form of UBPCs (Koont, 2011).  Together, the development 
of urban agriculture as a means of communal engagement and employment, in parallel 
with the expansion of agricultural cooperatives as firms based on socialized labour, 
indicates an overall socialization of the fictitious commodity of labour during the various 
phases of the special period.  
 
4.2.3. Incentives 
The profit motive has always been a central factor in free-market based 
commodity production (Schumpeter, 1994) and it was also a significant factor in the case 
of Havana’s urban agriculture (Koont, 2009; Gürcan, 2014). However profit alone cannot 







“Profits become the basis for incentive payments, which bring average incomes in 
urban agriculture well above nationwide averages for state employees. Also, 
various “moral” incentives exist for urban agriculturalists. On an individual level, 
these incentives offer ample opportunities for further formal education and a 
healthy, supportive, and dignified work environment. On a societal level there is 
an effort to “dignify” urban agricultural work and workers” (Koont, 2009, p.4). 
Similarly, Polanyi did not subscribe to the economistic view of humanity; rather for 
Polanyi, subjective motives and incentives that have to do with the individual or cultural 
needs play as much of a determining role in economic behaviour as more material based 
motives and incentives such as the fear of scarcity or a drive to accumulate wealth 
(Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001). Such a debate regarding the role of ideal or moral 
incentives and material incentives actually took place rather early on, following Cuba's 
1959 revolution. This debate was prefigured around the existing tension between Cuba's 
revolutionary aims of creating a society centred on reciprocity and ethical incentives, and 
the realization that the realpolitik of transforming work relations and production goals 
along the bureaucratic lines of other COMECON countries that occurred after Cuba 
began to pursue an eastern bloc model of development based on industrialized agriculture 
(Aponte-Garcia, 2009). Within organization type approximations, the latter approximates 
the rationalized bureaucratic work relations characteristic of the redistributive mode of 
economic incorporation, while the former approximates socialized communal and 






During the special period, Cuba encountered a turning point where it was forced 
to adopt a mixture of moral and material incentives as an alternative to both the defunct 
COMECON system of labour organization and the full embrace of the free market mode 
of economic incorporation (Deere, 1992; Premat, 2003). The moral incentives for 
engaging in volunteer agricultural work in the countryside, and communal urban 
agriculture in the cities, differed in accordance to the shifting social and economic 
relations between the early and late phases of the special period. During the early phase of 
the special period, both new material incentives in the form of engagement in private 
agriculture production and marketing surplus production emerged, as well as alternative 
moral incentives. Critics feared that the state's allowance of self-employment and the 
marketing of surplus agricultural production as an incentive to increase productivity 
would lead to an individualistic, market-based ethos (Premat, 2009).   
Additionally, the urban agriculture movement did encourage private and co-
operative producers to compete for the award of being officially recognized. These 
competitions however, were not market competition, rather they were competition to 
increase productivity where rewards consisted of immaterial motives such as pride and 
prestige, as well as some material but non-economic motives such as acquiring social 
capital with the municipal and state authorities, which often came with access to 
innovative new production inputs (Premat, 2009). So while in the early phase of the 
special period moral incentives were limited to communal cooperation, induced by the 






consolidation of more sustained altruistic motives where people engaged in urban 
agriculture not only to increase productivity, but to enjoy the socialization process itself, 
characterized by friendly non-market competition and the expanded participation of 
children and the elderly in urban agriculture as a form of participatory education and 
leisure activity (Premat, 2009).  Adriana Premat (2003) captures this new "civic ethos" 
(Premat, 2003, p.85) with the following observation: 
“All material benefits aside, many producers seemed to contribute to their 
community out of a genuine conviction in the correctness of their actions. The 
sharing of outputs, particularly when it involves total strangers, is striking when 
one considers that sale of these products is legal and could supplement the income 
of producers many of whom are already obliged to work after retirement to make 
ends meet...it would seem that Che Guevara's ideal of an Hombre Nuevo who 
"would become a stranger to the mercantile side of things, working for society and 
not for profit (Dumont, 1972, 52) is embodied in many of the producers with 
whom I worked” (Premat, 2003, p.94). 
Premat makes an important observation because the shift of values that accompanied the 
advancement of state-supported urban agriculture, in the form of changing social 









McClintock (2010) has connected the intensity of human labour involved in urban 
agriculture and the necessity of communal support to make it viable, as a uniquely 
socialized form of labour used in urban agriculture that contrasts the general alienation of 
labour which occurs in other sectors of work. This is because a return to the land and the 
manual engagement of cultivation overcomes the two forms of alienation that are 
prevalent in industrialized societies, alienation from the products of one’s labour and 
alienation from nature as the provider of the raw materials to be worked on (McClintock, 
2010). In the case of Cuba, Sinan Koont (2011) describes this trend as the “labour-
intensive paradigm” (p.174) in which, “[d]ue to the nature of the technologies it employs, 
urban agriculture is quite labor intensive…[and] the management of crops is once again 
returned to the meticulous attention of human beings” (Koont, 2011, p. 174).   
Within our Commodification/Socialization Scale then, the labour deployed in 
urban agriculture in Cuba during the special period, both manual and knowledge-based, 
clearly approximates the full socialization organization type that is promoted by the Food 
Sovereignty paradigm, which argues against the commodification of labour.  But what 
about the other normative concerns of the food sovereignty argument, how do they relate 
to the fictitious commodity of labour? In order to address these enquiries, it is necessary 
to consider the normative variables of the cultural and civic-participation dimensions of 
the socialized labour in the context of Cuba's urban agriculture.  By the later phase of the 






expanded opportunities, increasingly became subordinated to communal expectations 
signifying the consolidation of new cultural norms based on moral incentives (Premat, 
2003).  
 
4.2.5. Normative Variables:  
As we saw in chapter one, normative factors such as egalitarian values and the 
communal dynamics of societal organization that resist operationalization into formal 
analytical categories are crucial to human development and societal consistency (Murphy, 
1999; Murphy, 2008; Roberts, 2008). The importance of cultural integrity and civic 
engagement are matters that Polanyi addresses directly in his polemics where he 
demonstrates the disproportionately destructive effects that market domination asserts 
over entire societies through cultural erosion, effects that are far more destructive in the 
long-term than mere economic exploitation (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001). For Polanyi 
then, alienation is not merely a dimension of the formal commodification of labour, but 
the commodification of an entire cultural ethos that creates a variety of forms of civic 
disengagement that clear the way for the creation and perpetuation of a market society.  
In the examination of Cuban society, the question of egalitarian values must be 
put in context. Catherine Murphy (1999) explains that human development has been 
central to Cuba’s post- 1959 revolution development agenda, therefore community 






government established Agrarian Reform Law that limited private landownership and 
“redistributed land to squatters, sharecroppers, and landless farmers. Fifty percent of the 
land in Cuba was nationalized, and more than 100,000 landless peasants became 
landowners overnight (Diaz et al, 1995)” (Murphy, 1999, p. 7). As this example 
demonstrates, in order to explore how egalitarian values are practiced and sustained in the 
context of Cuba, we need to look at civic engagement in terms of participation at a 
grassroots level.  
The urban agriculture movement began as a grassroots civic interest group that 
wanted to expand using urban spaces for the purposes of urban agriculture, often against 
the directives of municipal urban planners (Koont, 2009). The onset of the special period 
shifted the balance of power in favor of the urban agriculture movement, as the Ministry 
of Agriculture sought to further empower these grassroots movements whilst providing 
logistical support (Cruz & Medina, 2003). The urban agriculture movement was 
supported and promoted by local initiatives including the Committee for the Defense of 
the Revolution and the People’s councils (Cruz & Medina, 2003), transforming it into a 
wide reaching movement representing the interests of urban dwellers who had to contend 
with prospects of acute food shortages. From its beginnings then, the urban agriculture 
movement had all the attributes of local engagement in the sphere of production, as 
mandated by state organizations (Koont, 2009; Koont, 2011).  
The urban agriculture movement presents an ambiguous case of state-led 






which restructured agricultural production and represented grassroots interest groups set 
against urban planners (Koont, 2009). On the other hand, its promotion and expansion by 
various state organizations into a medium for civic participation in food production makes 
its overall function closer to those of state organizations. The role of state organizations 
cannot be overemphasized since they actively transformed the existing centralized 
political structure to meet the needs of the urban agriculture movement and realized early 
on that if the challenges of the special period were to be met head on, they needed the 
active support and engagement of the Cuban people (Cruz & Medina, 2003).  
 
4.2.6. Conclusion 
This section examined the status of labour as a fictitious commodity within the 
context of Cuba’s special period. The status of labour, taking into account both analytical 
variables such as employment trends and incentive schemes, as well as normative 
variables such as civic engagement, reveal that labour in Cuba during the special period 
did conform to the full socialization ideal type of reciprocity. This is the most unique 
finding of this study because according to Polanyi’s framework, Cuba achieved what 
every “actually existing” socialist state, within the COMECON trade regime, had aspired 
to but fell short of due to the over-rationalization of labour relations. In terms of food 
sovereignty, it is evident that state instigated reforms to promote worker engagement and 
the promotion of social value for urban food producers meets the sixth pillar, Value Food 






4.3.0. Assessment of fictitious commodity: Money 
The fictitious commodity category of money reaches the heart of Karl Polanyi’s 
entire framework of fictitious commodities because it determines the mode of economic 
integration. For instance, the absence of money in a given society signals the absence of a 
market society, whereas the extension of money beyond its function as a medium of 
payment and into the realm of profit generation, i.e. commodity speculation, signals the 
presence of a self-regulating market economy (Polanyi, 1968; Polanyi, 2001).   
This section examines Cuba’s mode of economic integration, both at the national 
level as well as the international level, during its period of transition in the special period. 
This section provides a theoretical analysis of entitlements to food through market 
channels and the role that non-commodified money plays in Polanyi’s theory of the 
purchasing-power economy. Additionally, this section analyzes the role of markets during 
Cuba’s special period.  
 
4.3.1. Transitions in the mode of economic integration 
As discussed in earlier chapters there are two levels of economic integration, the 
domestic or national level that involves the integration of the economy into society, and 
the international or global level that is a characteristic of geopolitical and trade relations 
between nations (Polanyi 2001). Moreover, only the market mode of economic 






market is the only mode of economic integration that has the potential to dis-embed from 
society (Polanyi 2001).  
At the onset of the special period, Cuba encountered a turning point. Prior to this 
point, at the domestic level Cuba’s economy had been incorporated into Cuban society 
through the redistributive mode, while at the international level it was incorporated into 
the mercantilist COMECON trading bloc (Cruz & Medina, 2003). With the failure of 
central planning at the heart of COMECON, in which the USSR had politically 
subsidized the nations within this trading bloc, the majority of the COMECON member 
states including the Soviet Union itself moved towards market reforms, thereby 
undergoing a transition to market economies (Aponte-Garcia, 2009). Cuba opted for an 
alternative form of decentralizing its redistributive-mercantilist economy. Based on our 
examination of the fictitious commodities of land-nature and labour up to this point, it has 
been shown that the alternative to the market economy, which Cuba followed during the 
special period, can best be characterized as a reciprocal mode of integration with regards 
to the variables of decentralized land distribution schemes, sustainable resource 
management, and the further socialization of labour and incentives in the urban 
agriculture sector. Furthermore, the decentralization of agricultural production, both in 
terms of the agricultural sector itself as well as the local level of urban agriculture through 
the land reforms of 1993, overtly expanded Cuba’s food production under the new post- 






Due to various challenges, including the collapse of COMECON mercantilism 
during the early phase of the special period, necessitated emergency measures included 
the introduction of market-based incentives to further promote food production and to 
allow for self-employment, and most crucially, to activate alternative channels of food 
distribution to mitigate the emerging food crises (Deere, 1992; Koont, 2011).  In its most 
explicit form, dollar store markets for grocers, utilizing U.S. currency, opened to 
complement the existing peso markets (Ross & Mayo, 2003). Furthermore the state 
permitted the surplus of agricultural produce, which increasingly was associated with 
urban agriculture, to be sold in local farmer’s markets that opened in 1994, after the 
Council of Ministers agreed to it. This enabled the opening of new, but still regulated, 
commercial prospects within domestic markets (Alvarez & Messina, 1996).  
Therefore, while land reforms, the adaptation of agroecological resource 
management practices, and communal urban agricultural production all signified a 
transition towards greater socialization of labour and resources through decentralization 
towards communal reciprocity, the proliferation of alternative monetary currencies along 










4.3.2. Critical assessment of role of money and entitlements in society 
As noted earlier, the introduction of alternative currencies and monetary motives 
was necessitated to mitigate the scarcity of food supplies during the early phase of the 
special period. Amartya Sen (1981) has shown that in periods of political or economic 
instability, it is often failure to recognize people’s existing entitlements to the available 
food supplies, rather than shortcomings the supply of food itself that leads to calamitous 
consequences. Sen views entitlements as a set of conditional factors such as commodity 
endowments or the right to exchange such endowments in order to meet one’s needs, as 
determined by an individual’s place within the given economic and political context (Sen 
1981, p.435). In other words, entitlements are the tokens within a given context that 
enables efficient resource allocation. In the case of Cuba during the onset of the special 
period, both the supply of food and channels of access to food were endangered (Deere, 
1992; Koont, 2011).  During this time, with the limits of the food ration system, many 
people had to turn to alternative channels of food procurement to supplement their 
nutritional needs, for example by purchasing fruits and vegetables from farmer’s markets, 
meat and dairy from filial connections and black market networks for those who could not 
afford to pay the high farmer’s market prices, and cooking oil from dollar store markets 
(Paponnet-Cantat, 2003, p.20). As this example illustrates, food procurement strategies 
involved access to alternative entitlement channels. In other words, monetary pluralism 






How would the development of such tendencies by addressed by Polanyi’s 
economic framework? As discussed, Polanyi was not averse to the co-existence of 
elements of the market alongside other societal institutions. In fact, Polanyi believed in a 
plurality of motives and incentives, which determined the behaviour of individuals and 
societies. Polanyi’s concern with markets had to do with their potential to dis-embed from 
society (Berthound, 1990). This concern was expressed not only within acute contexts, 
such as global economic crises, but also with the gradual and insidious commodification 
of ‘fictitious commodities’ and social life as a whole. Within Polanyi’s theory of the 
purchasing-power economy, where the function of money is limited to purely a means of 
payment, we can see that although money may be used as a medium of market 
transaction, it functions as a token of exchange and not as a commodity in itself (Polanyi, 
1968; Polanyi, 2001). This is why Polanyi was highly averse to the commodification of 
money for generating profits through the exchange of currency differentials. It is within 
these latter, expanded capacities of money which generate a self-regulating market in 
money as a commodity which can threaten to dis-embed from societal institutions 
(Polanyi, 2001).  
 
4.3.3. The status of markets in Cuban society during the special period 
As discussed, market incentives and alternative currencies were introduced in 
Cuba during the special period to open channels of entitlement for alternative means of 






For Polanyi, the co-existence of markets alongside other societal institutions is reasonable 
so long as these societal institutions can ensure that the market remains embedded in 
order to meet societal needs. We can discern three factors that have ensured the 
embedding of local markets into Cuban society: 1) the local scale of the markets, 2) state 
oversight of the market sphere, and 3) the emergence of counter-tendencies during the 
special period. 
During the special period, markets were limited to local scales (Alvarez & 
Messina, 1996), and as such served a social function as an alternative means of resource 
distribution, as well as the expression of market motives by urban agricultural producers 
who wished to expand their income by marketing the surplus of their production. The 
local function that such markets fulfilled then was a limiting factor for their activity. The 
creation of a self-regulating market entails either the pre-existence of a market society or 
vast capital reserves to expand into economies of scale (Polanyi 1968; Polanyi 2001), 
neither of which exists in the Cuban context.  
A further market-embedding factor is state oversight, most commonly in the form 
of taxation. Taxation rates varied from 8 percent of the commodity price to 15 percent, 
depending on the geographical location of the dollar markets (Alveraz & Messina, 1996; 
Fusco, 2008). Through such geographic channelling via taxation rates, the state was able 
to direct supplies through the markets (Fusco, 2008), further demonstrating the 
embeddedness of these local markets.  Finally, the trends towards the expanded 






agriculture indicate that counter-veiling relations of reciprocity managed to keep the local 
markets embedded.  This point is emphasized by Premat’s (2003) observation that: 
“Whereas Special Period reforms in other sectors of the Cuban economy may 
indeed be leading to the re-construction of ‘Capitalist – Man,’ government 
institutions and policies affecting small scale urban agriculture appear to be 
keeping in check the individualistic behaviour associated with capitalist societies. 
As shown, the continuing dependence e of producers on the state…partly explains 
why, while showing definitive signs of ‘privatization’ and segregation, the 
parcelas turn out to be closely linked to an ideal notion of community where 
sharing and cooperation are underscored as vital, even when individual needs and 
dimensions are acknowledged and practiced” (Premat, 2003, p.95) 
Premat’s final point on the compatibility of communal and individual dimensions 
resonates with Polanyi’s satisfaction with the existence of plural motives in society. 
Interestingly, unlike the fictitious commodities of land-nature and labour, the 
status of money within the context of Cuba’s special period approximates the fully 
commodified ideal-type within our Commodification/Socialization Scale for Fictitious 
Commodities. Despite these trends, the threat of developing self-regulating markets in 
money, which Polanyi warns of, do not apply to the Cuban special period context due to 
multiple factors that had ensured that the existing local markets remained embedded 






4.4.0. Discussion  
In order to test the hypothesis regarding the degree to which Cuba achieved food 
sovereignty during its socioeconomic transition in the special period, this study 
operationalized the working tenets of the Food Sovereignty paradigm into Polanyi’s 
economic framework, which frames the issue in terms of the tension between markets and 
societies, where food sovereignty can be seen as having been achieved through the de-
commodification (socialization) of land, natural resources, labour, and money, which are 
used for agricultural production. The operationalization of the food sovereignty argument 
involved the use of Polanyi’s three fictitious commodities of land-nature, labour and 
money as indicators, in which the degree to which these resources have become 
commodified or socialized, in accordance to the scale of pre-established ideal –type 
references, indicates the degree to which their usage approximates the Six Pillars of Food 
Sovereignty. This framework also allowed for the characterization of the transitions 
between Cuba’s political and economic system according to its mode of economic 
incorporation.  
In this study of Cuba’s experience with urban agriculture during the special 
period, it was found that the agrarian reforms passed during the onset of the special period 
allowed the public greater access to land for the purpose of urban agriculture, allowing 
for more efficient food production, as well as the expansion of entitlements that were 
overseen by the state’s retention of land titles. The decentralization and fair distribution of 






agricultural sector, moving away from industrialized agricultural production, which also 
narrowed the metabolic rift between resource utilization and its ecological impact and 
indicate a balanced equilibrium between economic activity and the utilization of natural 
resources. These factors indicate that land-nature as a fictitious commodity was put into 
environmentally balanced use to meet social needs, indicating its full socialization.   
In regards to the fictitious commodity of labour, this study found that Cuba’s land 
and agrarian reforms that were passed by a decree in 1993, led to the decentralization of 
agricultural production and expanded entitlements for private and communal plots to be 
used for urban agricultural production.  Furthermore, the emergence of relations of 
reciprocity and civic engagement at the community level, as well as the emergence of a 
plurality of material and moral incentives towards urban agricultural production indicated 
that labour, as the fictitious commodity, approximated the fully socialized ideal type 
during the special period, more so than it had under central planning. This was indicated 
empirically in the expansion of formal and informal employment in urban agriculture to 
meet the needs of localized food production. With the de-automation that resulted from 
Cuba’s transition away from industrial agriculture to agroecology, along with increased 
civic engagement in communal decision making, the fictitious commodity of labour 
overcame the forms of alienation that are integral to  industrialized labour, thereby 
demonstrating its full socialization.  
The most urgent problem that Cuba faced during the onset of the special period 






the public, while structurally the economy underwent a process of decentralization. Under 
these conditions, the Peso was supplemented by the Dollar in a scheme of parallel 
currencies that emerged with the establishment of dollar stores, where consumers could 
purchase items at higher prices that were not available through state-distribution schemes, 
as well as the rise of farmers markets where any produce surplus from private or 
communal urban agricultural production could be marketed at profit.  
Within this study’s socialization/commodification scale, developments such as the 
introduction of a plurality of currencies and monetary incentives clearly indicate a trend 
towards the commodification of money in Cuba during the special period. This study 
found however, that overall this commodification of the fictitious commodity of money 
was kept in check by three factors that ensured that the local markets remained embedded 
towards serving socialized functions within Cuban society: 1) the local scale of the 
markets, 2) state oversight of the market sphere and 3) the emergence of counter-
tendencies during the special period, which as we have seen, pertains to the full 
socialization of the other two fictitious commodities, land-nature and labour.  
Overall, the findings demonstrate that during the special period, Cuba transitioned 
from a redistributive mode of economic incorporation, which was dominated by state 
planning, to a reciprocal mode of incorporation that required the active participation of 
citizens at a communal level, a plurality of moral and material motives, as well as the 
expansion of entitlements to allow for acute resource allocation at the site of urban 






“Whereas Cuba’s original revolutionary land reform took place in the 1960s, a 
later “reform within the reform” allowed Cuba to escape from a food crisis in the 
1990s, in what may be the closest example of a true transition  from agro-export 
toward a more food sovereignty-centered model of the kind called for by Vía 
Campesina” (Rosset, 2009a, p.3). 
This observation matches the findings of this study; the overall human development 
inherent to the Food Sovereignty paradigm was indeed observed in Cuba during the 
special period. Analytically, this study revealed that developments in the area of urban 
agriculture corresponded with the full socialization of two of Polanyi’s fictitious 
commodities, land-nature and labour, alongside a trend of further commodification of the 
fictitious commodity of money. Since the latter was kept in check through a multitude of 
factors to meet social needs however, it did not act as a true commodity under the 
circumstances of the special period, in its function of expanding entitlements for acute 
resource allocation. The overall interplay between the three fictitious commodities, as 
geared towards meeting societal needs during a period of acute crises, confirms the 












The objective of this thesis was to assess the hypothesis that Cuba achieved a high 
degree of food sovereignty during the special period through its adoption of 
agroecological practices. This objective was met by operationalizing the criteria for food 
sovereignty into an analytical framework through Karl Polanyi’s analytical concepts of 
fictitious commodities and through the construction of ideal-types for a scale of 
assessment. Assessment of the status of the three fictitious commodities land-nature, 
labour, and money within the context of urban agriculture in Havana during the special 
period revealed that two of the three fictitious commodities (land-nature and labour) 
approximated the ideal-type for full socialization, which demonstrates their non-
commodified status within Cuban society during the special period. The use of the 
fictitious commodity of money on the other hand, had become more commodified as a 
result of the reforms that took place during the special period to allow for greater 
flexibility in the emergency allocation of scarce resources, such as food through the 
expansion of entitlements, although money remained embedded within local markets and 
thereby still fulfilled social needs.  The urgent need to introduce flexibility to resource 
allocation whilst at the same time ensuring that the economy remained embedded to meet 
the needs of society without transforming into a force of disequilibrium itself was a 






Moreover, re-embedding markets into the larger societal structure is a 
fundamental component of the Food Sovereignty paradigm; as Cuba’s context illustrated, 
it is possible to achieve this by ensuring that the state regulates markets and endorses the 
introduction of localized markets, which remain limited to serving societal needs. This 
was a critical factor in Cuba’s success with urban agriculture. 
The results of this analysis, combined with the examination of the relevance of 
Cuba’s agricultural and food policies and practices during the special period with the 
criteria set forth by the Six Pillars of Food Sovereignty, demonstrate that Cuba achieved a 
strong degree of food sovereignty during the special period.  Since the special period was 
a time of crises and transition that required substantial reforms, for example state-led land 
reforms and policies that dismantled previous large-scale industrial agricultural land 
schemes and established small-scale agroecological food production systems, Cuba did 
not fully realize food sovereignty in terms of establishing abundant food reserves (Altieri 
& Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 2012).  
There are several factors to influence this outcome, the main being that Cuba has 
historically been a food importing nation that lacked sufficient food reserves (Murphy, 
1999; Altieri & Funes-Monzote, 2012). Second, during the special period state-supported 
reforms were undertaken to implement, support and expand agroecology; by definition 
agroecological food production is a long term investment and since Cuba was lacking in 
food reserves, it would not be feasible for the nation to build bountiful food reserves 






Moreover, it is significant to note that Cuba’s food self-sufficiency was much 
higher during the special period of the 1990s than it had been in the 1980s. By the mid-
1980s, Cuba’s imported more than 50 percent of its food supply in order to meet 
population needs (Murphy, 1999). The evidence clearly indicates that the agrarian 
reforms and legislative changes that the Cuban state undertook during the special period 
greatly reduced the nation’s food import dependency (Altieri & Funes-Monzote, 2012). 
By 2003, it was observed that “import dependency, however, [was] a mere 16 percent” 
(Altieri & Funes-Monzote, 2012, p. 3). 
Taking into account Cuba’s history, the fact that the special period was by 
definition a time of crisis, as well as the rising trends of global food insecurity during the 
time of Cuba’s special period, food sovereignty researchers argue that Cuba’s successes 
in food sovereignty are nothing short of magnificent. Furthermore, according to 
researchers; 
“No other country in the world has achieved this level of success with a form of 
agriculture that uses the ecological services of biodiversity and reduces food 
miles, energy use, and effectively closes local production and consumption 
cycles” (Altieri and Funes-Monzote 2012, p.1). 
According to the Food Sovereignty paradigm, within the globalized neoliberal context, 
food sovereignty is only achievable if nations shift priorities and undergo certain types of 
reforms (La Via Campesina, 2010; Altieri & Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 2012); many of 






Sovereignty. One recommendation is the substitution of the market-led development 
model with a state-led development model, particularly one with a strong emphasis on the 
adoption of agroecology-based agrarian reform (Koont, 2009; La Via Campesina, 2010; 
Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Altieri & Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 2012).  It is important to 
note that agroecology – based food production can only be successful if the state takes an 
active role in protecting the interests of small-scale food producing communities and their 
access to land, water, seeds, and local markets (Rosset, 2009b; La Via Campesina, 2010; 
Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Altieri & Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 2012).  
Additionally, state intervention is also required to protect the national food supply 
from international vulnerabilities, from the market’s commodification of food, and from 
market speculation (Polanyi, 2001; Saul, 2005; Davidson, 2009; Ziegler, 2013).  
Moreover, state-intervention is also required to protect nation’s food production 
capacities, i.e. the agricultural sector, from market forces, via regulations (Altieri & 
Toledo, 2011; McMichael & Schneider, 2011; Altieri & Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 
2012; Ziegler 2013). In this sense, market reforms are needed to remove land and 
agricultural products from commodity speculation (McMichael & Schneider, 2011; 
Ziegler, 2013).  
These are some of the reforms recommended by food sovereignty proponents and 
theses require a shift in development agendas, to transfer the onus of development back to 
the state since the state is equipped to re-embed markets back into societies, so that the 






2001; Rosset 2011; Gürcan, 2014). Moreover, state-led development prioritizing agrarian 
reform is central to successfully establishing food sovereignty (La Via Campesina, 2010; 
Altieri & Funes-Monzote, 2012). Some suggested reforms for the agricultural sector 
include de-privatization of agricultural lands, market and land reforms to dismantle 
industrial agricultural complexes, and the establishment of small-scale agroecology-based 
farming communities across nations (Koont, 2009; Altieri & Toledo, 2011; Torrez, 2011; 
Altieri & Funes-Monzote & Petersen, 2012). It is also recommended that states establish 
local agricultural markets within communities in order to make locally produced food 
accessible to local populations (Altieri & Fune- Monzante, 2012); this was observed in 
the Cuban context. As Faustino Torrez (2011) explains, 
“It must be an agrarian reform that gives legal guarantees to peasants who have 
occupied lands to survive; an agrarian reform that guarantees communal land 
ownership and that is designed to resist the threat of counter-agrarian reform ” 
(Torrez, 2011, p.51). 
This is an important point that highlights the proposition that governments promote the 
formation of, and provide support for, local agricultural associations within farming 
communities to ensure the protection and autonomy of farming communities (Altieri & 
Fune- Monzante 2012).  In the Cuban context, this was found to be the case; Cuba’s 
development agenda has conceptualized food as a human right since 1959 (Murphy, 
1999) and the state undertook reforms to achieve its aims to meet this population need 






Still more, proponents of food sovereignty recommend that market regulation 
measures be taken to “stabilize and guarantee fair prices to farmers, workers and 
consumers by re-establishing floor prices and publicly-owned national grain reserves at 
home and abroad” (Holt-Giménez, 2008, Pg. 13). This is because the advancement of the 
agroecology-based agriculture model requires state intervention to protect small-scale 
domestic food producers and facilitate their access to local resources and the necessary 
infrastructure to enable them to meet domestic market demands (Rosset, 2009b). In this 
sense, the Food Sovereignty paradigm requires state-intervention to re-embed markets 
within society and to formulate regulations that also marked Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
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